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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF DYNAMIC PRICING AND REVENUE MANAGEMENT ON
AGENT BEHAVIOR AND CUSTOMER PERCEPTION
Xingwei Lu
Xuanming Su
My dissertation extends the traditional fields of revenue management and dynamic pricing
to newer markets. Specifically, my first two chapters explore the revenue management
strategies and their impacts in the airline industry in the presence of loyalty programs. The
first chapter solves the optimal revenue management algorithms when the firm is rewarding
frequent customers with free capacity. Using a game-theoretic Littlewood model, we show
that limiting award capacity can increase profits by enhancing loyalty award values; airlines
can benefit from transitioning from mileage-based programs to revenue-based programs by
simplifying its revenue management algorithm and allowing 100% award availability. The
second chapter investigates customers’ evaluations of loyalty program points. By fitting a
Multinomial Logit model on DB1B data set, we calibrate customers’ valuations for loyalty
points at the issuance and redemption. We have two main conclusions: consumers are
rational about the value of miles at issuance, but underestimate and overspend miles at
redemption; higher award availability and more award choices lead to higher values of
Loyalty points. Finally, my third chapter examines the impact of dynamic pricing in the
ride-sharing economy. By using actual Uber pricing and partner data, the paper shows that
ride-sharing platforms can efficiently signal market conditions, stimulate desirable agents’
behavior, and reduce marketplace frictions through dynamic pricing.
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CHAPTER 1 : REVENUE MANAGEMENT WITH LOYALTY PROGRAMS
This paper studies loyalty programs in firms such as airlines and hotels, where limited ca-
pacity is commonplace and revenue management is crucial. Based on Littlewood’s classic
two-type model, our model additionally reserves some capacity for rewards and allows cus-
tomers to choose between paying with cash and redeeming with points. We have three
conclusions. First, we show that revenue management algorithms need to be adjusted to
include award liability, i.e. the cost of issuing points to customers. However, the adjustment
can be neglected if the number of issued points is proportional the customers’ purchasing
price. Second, the optimal award capacity is constrained by a fixed level of redemption
probability in loyalty points. However, the redemption probability can be as high as 100%
if the number of redeemed points is proportional to the price. Finally, several airlines
(American, United and Delta) recently switched from rewarding customers based on their
purchasing quantity (volume-based) to rewarding them based on their purchasing expense
(expense-based). Other airlines (Southwest and JetBlue) decide both the issuance and re-
demption based on the purchasing price (point-based programs). We compare the pros
and cons of these program schemes. We show that volume-based schemes enhance profits
but generate accounting challenges. Expense-based schemes maintain profitability while
eliminating accounting challenges. Point-based schemes lose these profits in return for high
customer satisfaction, with a 100% award availability.
1.1. Introduction
Loyalty programs are ubiquitous among service firms such as airlines, hotels and rental
businesses. Well-known examples include American Airlines AAdvantage, Hilton HHonors,
and Hertz Gold Plus, all of which reward frequent patronage with free services. Whether
they are free flights or free hotel stays, loyalty rewards all take up capacity, which is a
constrained resource in service firms. While firms strive to fulfill their obligation of giving
out rewards to eligible customers, they have to accept the reality that every reward may
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potentially displace a cash-paying customer. There is a constant tug-of-war between reward
and cash customers vying for the same pool of capacity. This problem immediately calls to
mind revenue management techniques, which have been developed to sell the right product
to the right customer at the right price. Our goal in this paper is to study optimal revenue
management strategies in the presence of loyalty programs.
There is substantial variation in the amount of capacity that firms set aside for loyalty
program members. Consequently, reward availability differs widely across firms. In a survey
on reward seat availability of 20 airlines, Southwest Airlines enjoys the first place with 100%
availability, while US Airways is at the bottom, trailing with an reward availability of 35%
(Ideaworks, 2015). Because of the limited reward availability, on average, about 15% to
20% of issued miles are never redeemed (Gerchick, 2013). Similarly, the hotel industry also
exhibits some variation in reward availability. In a survey of seven hotel loyalty programs
(BoardingArea, 2015), Marriott Rewards tops the chart with an availability rate of 99%,
while Choice Privileges ends up at the bottom with an availability rate of 81%. Such
variation suggests that there is no simple formula to the question of how much capacity
should be allocated to loyalty rewards. We shall examine this issue in this paper.
To facilitate reward transactions, loyalty points have emerged as a virtual currency. Typi-
cally, customers earn points for their purchases and subsequently redeem points for rewards.
When an reward is issued, the firm receives no cash income and merely retrieves a bulk of the
faux currency that was previously issued. Despite the apparent lack of dividends, it appears
that loyalty rewards somehow still pay off. For example, frequent flyer program members
are willing to spend 2% to 12% more for similar itineraries provided by the program carrier
than by other airlines (Brunger, 2013), 67% of travelers report that hotel loyalty programs
are highly influential in their choices (Cognizant, 2014), and restaurant loyalty programs
increase visits by 35% (Loyalogy, 2014). One possible theory for the increased profit is that
loyalty points do carry value to customers. In fact, casual assessments tend to put the value
of most loyalty points at between $0.01 and $0.02 each; for example, an AAdvantage mile
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is estimated to be worth $0.017 (BoardingArea, 2014). The value of points hinge greatly
upon the value and availability of the award the points can redeem for. In this spirit, we
analyze how revenue management rules impact the value of points and customer decisions.
The issuance and redemption of loyalty points can be fixed or price-dependent. For example,
consider Traveler A who commutes between Philadelphia and San Francisco every month.
A full-fare roundtrip ticket is priced at $800, but a discounted airfare at $300 is occasionally
offered. If he is enrolled in a volume-based program, such as the old version of American
Airlines’ AAdvantage program, he would be rewarded the same number of miles (5,030) for
each ticket regardless of the price. However, in 2016, American Airlines started to reward
customers based on how much they pay. Specifically, the new program issues 5 miles for
every dollar customers spent. Hence, the customer earns 4,000 miles for a full-fare ticket
and 1,500 miles for a discount-fare ticket. We refer to the new program as expense-based
program. American Airlines was not the first to make this change. In fact, United and
Delta Airlines abandoned the traditional mileage program and switched to an expense-
based program in 2014. The media reaction to such design change is mixed. Supporters
argue that the change is more fair to high-paying customers (Forbes, 2013) and may help
slow an ongoing trend of mileage devaluation (Airline Weekly, 2015). However, critics
believe that leisure customers are more responsive to loyalty program incentives (New York
Times, 2014, Bloomberg, 2014).
Note that in both volume-based and expense-based programs, the redemption of loyalty
points are price-independent. Specifically, Traveler A is required the same number of fre-
quent flyer miles (usually 250,000 miles) to redeem any roundtrip ticket regardless of its
price. However, this is not the case for JetBlue’s and Southwest’s loyalty programs, in which
the number of miles needed for an award is proportional to the price. For example, if the
traveler is enrolled Southwest Rapid Rewards program, he is required to pay 70 miles for
every dollar he redeems for. Therefore, the traveler pays 56,000 miles for a full-fare ticket
($800) and pays 21,000 for a discount-fare ticket ($300). We refer to these programs as
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point-based programs.
This paper aims to study the interaction between revenue management and loyalty pro-
grams. Specifically, we focus on the following three questions.
1. How to characterize revenue management decisions in the presence of loyalty pro-
grams?
2. How should firms determine the amount of capacity to set aside for loyalty awards?
3. What are pros and cons of each type of loyalty programs?
To answer these questions, we gathered empirical evidence from participants about their
perceptions of loyalty programs. Based on the evidence, we incorporate loyalty programs
into Littlewood’s (1972) model of quantity-based revenue management. In the classic model,
the firm sells a limited capacity by allocating it between low-paying customers already
seeking to buy and high-paying customers who may not arrive; in our model, we add
loyalty awards as a third use of the firm’s capacity. Customers choose between paying cash
and redeeming awards to maximize utility. We solve for the customers’ medium of purchase
and the firm’s revenue management decisions in equilibrium under three different program
designs. We have three conclusions.
First, we show that revenue management algorithms need to be adjusted by including award
liability into prices. The award liability reflects the expected opportunity cost of fulfilling fu-
ture redemptions of loyalty points. Nevertheless, this adjustment becomes redundant when
the issuance of points is proportional to prices (expense-based and point-based schemes). In
such cases, revenue management decisions are prescribed as if there is no loyalty programs.
Second, the optimal award capacity is constrained by quantity sold to customers. The reason
is that the firm needs to restrict the redemption probability of loyalty points and limit their
values, so that the customers prefer to use points immediately rather than hoard them for
future use, since “future use” may never materialize. However, if the number of redeemed
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points is proportional to the price (point-based schemes), a 100% award availability rate
can be optimal, which can be explained below. The specific redemption rule creates a fixed
conversion rate between cash and point. On the demand side, customers have no incentives
to hoard points for future uses. On the supply side, the firm can treat award customers and
cash-paying customers equally, and provide an award availability rate as high as 100%.
Finally, we compare the three types of program schemes. Volume-based schemes enhance
profits but generate accounting challenges; expense-based programs maintain profitability
while eliminating accounting challenges; point-based programs give up these profits in return
for customer satisfaction with a 100% award availability. As explained in the previous point,
a low redemption probability induces customers to spend loyalty points more immediately.
In fact, customers spend more than they are willing to pay in cash. Consequently, when
giving out loyalty awards and collecting payment in the form of loyalty points, the firm
can extract a higher payment than what could have been possible with cash. In contrast,
point-based programs create a fixed conversion rate between points and cash, which does
not breed overspending behavior of loyalty points. Hence, point-based programs are less
profitable but also less restrictive - firms need not maintain a low redemption probability
and find it optimal to accept any redemption requests.
1.2. Literature Review
There has been extensive research on loyalty programs in the marketing literature. Readers
can refer to Bijmolt et al. (2010) and Breugelmans et al. (2014) for recent reviews. This
body of work seeks to measure the effect of loyalty programs using sales data and results
are mixed. Early studies (e.g., Sharp and Sharp, 1997) did not find significant evidence
of increased purchase frequency. There were also results suggesting that loyalty programs,
even if profitable, do not derive benefit from frequent buyers: loyalty programs have the
least impact on these customers (Lal and Bell, 2003), and yet they are the ones most
likely to claim rewards (Liu, 2007). However, Bolton et al. (2000) showed that members
of loyalty programs discount or overlook negative service experiences. In another study,
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Taylor and Neslin (2005) demonstrated both a points-pressure effect (customers buy more
as they get closer to earning rewards) and a rewarded-behavior effect (customers buy more
after savoring the benefit of rewards). In terms of methodology, Lewis (2004) introduced a
structural modeling framework to model repeated purchase decisions as a dynamic program
and found that the loyalty program being studied was successful in increasing purchases
for a substantial fraction of customers. While the above papers focused on the frequency
reward component, Kopalle et al (2012) also considered the customer tier component (e.g.,
silver or gold status) of loyalty programs; using a dynamic structural model, they found
that customers buy more as they approach the next tier. Similar to most papers above,
we focus on the frequency reward component of loyalty programs, but we ask a new set of
question: how should firms adjust the value of loyalty points through capacity allocations
and pricing strategies? How would these decisions change under volume-based and expense-
based programs? These aspects can have a significant impact on customer behavior and firm
profits in industries such as airlines and hotels when price fluctuations are commonplace.
Our work is also related to the literature on consumer behavior in the context of loyalty
programs. Many papers have studied how consumers perceive and value loyalty points
as an independent currency. Using a reference dependence framework, Dre`ze and Nunes
(2004) developed a mental accounting model where customers evaluate different currencies
(i.e., cash and loyalty points) in separate accounts; Stourm et al. (2015) recently extended
this mental accounting model to explain why many customers stockpile loyalty points even
though the firm does not reward such behavior. In another study, van Osselaer et al. (2004)
showed that loyalty points are an overvalued currency and create an illusion of progress.
In a similar vein, Kivetz et al. (2006) and Nunes and Dre`ze (2006) showed that artificial
advancement (e.g., replacing a 10-stamp coffee card with a 12-stamp card that starts with
2 stamps already filled in) increases customer effort; the former study also found evidence
of purchase acceleration as customers come closer to earning rewards. These results suggest
that customers place an explicit value on each loyalty point even though loyalty points are
only a medium (i.e., a means to an end); see Hsee et al. (2003) on the medium effect. Finally,
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Raghubir and Srivastava (2002) and Wertenbroch et al. (2007) found that consumers’
valuation of an unfamiliar currency (such as loyalty points) is biased towards the face value;
a possible explanation is that consumers anchor on the nominal face value and do not adjust
sufficiently for the exchange rate when making decisions. Sayman and Hoch (2014) showed
that buyers are willing to pay a price premium for loyalty points, and the premium is less
than the normative levels. Motivated by these behavioral studies, our theoretical model
takes the view that each loyalty point is a unit of currency valued at the nominal face value
of goods that it can be redeemed for.
It is useful to put our work in the context of existing research that elucidates the economic
function of loyalty programs. The bulk of this research focuses on the switching costs
generated by loyalty programs (for example, travelers who have accumulated many miles
at an airline will not be keen to switch to another airline). Consequently, loyalty programs
soften price competition and facilitate tacit collusion; see Kim et al. (2001), Singh at al.
(2008) and Fong and Liu (2011) for models along these lines. Another economic explanation
for loyalty programs is price discrimination. Since frequency rewards such as buy-n-get-one-
free are a type of quantity discounts, loyalty programs can facilitate price discrimination
between frequent and occasional customers (Hartmann and Viard, 2008), or between “cherry
pickers” who buy from lowest-priced stores and single-store-shoppers (Lal and Bell, 2003),
or between heavy and light users (Kim at al, 2001). Next, it has also been demonstrated
that loyalty programs enable firms to profit from the agency relationship between employers
and employees. Typically, employers pay for business trips but employees reap the benefits
from loyalty rewards; see Cairns and Galbraith (1990) and Basso et al. (2009). In another
study, Kim et al. (2004) showed that loyalty programs can help regulate capacity in face of
demand uncertainty: when demand is low, firms can offer loyalty rewards to reduce excess
capacity and ease the pressure to slash prices. Although we have limited capacity in our
model, our results do not rely on this mechanism because in our model, capacity is allocated
for redemption before demand uncertainty is realized. Instead, our analysis highlights a new
function of loyalty programs: since loyalty points are appraised at face value, they enable
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firms to extract surplus when customers redeem points on items that they are unwilling to
pay cash to buy.
Another stream of related literature is the revenue management literature on capacity con-
trols. In most models, the firms allocates capacity to different booking classes, and when
a lower-priced booking class is sold out, customers can only purchase at a higher-priced
booking class. Such capacity allocation decisions trace back to Littlewood (1972), who
showed using a two-class model that current bookings should be accepted as long as their
revenue exceed the expected value of future bookings. This work has been extended to
multiple booking classes (e.g., Wollmer, 1992, Brumelle and McGill, 1993, Robinson, 1995)
in arbitrary order of arrival (e.g., Lee and Hersh, 1993, Lautenbacher and Stidham, 1999).
Now known as Littlewood’s rule, the original model has also been the basis for the expected
marginal seat revenue heuristics, which were proposed by Belobaba (1989) and widely used
in revenue management practice (see comprehensive reviews by McGill and van Ryzin, 1999,
Bitran and Caldentey, 2003, Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003, and the reference book by
Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). Subsequent revenue management models of capacity controls
incorporate additional complexities such as buy-up behavior (Belobaba and Weatherford,
1996), customer substitution (Shumsky and Zhang, 2004), choice between parallel flights
(Zhang and Cooper, 2005), and competition (Netessine and Shumsky, 2005). Our analysis
in this paper is based on Littlewood’s rule, but our research takes a different perspective:
instead of allocating capacity to lower-priced classes, we are interested in allocating capac-
ity for redemption of loyalty rewards. In fact, given that this is a central concern in any
capacity-constrained firm running a loyalty program, we are surprised that there has been
little to no work on understanding the interactions between capacity and loyalty rewards.
More recently, over the last decade, the literature on revenue management and dynamic
pricing has paid more attention to strategic customer behavior (see Netessine and Tang,
2009, for a review). When making purchase decisions, customers adopt a forward-looking
perspective and take future price changes and potential stock-outs into consideration (see,
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e.g., Su, 2007, Liu and van Ryzin, 2008, Aviv and Pazgal, 2008). Such a dynamic customer
perspective is particularly important in the context of loyalty programs because frequency
rewards earned over multiple purchases are inherently dynamic. In our model, not all loy-
alty points will be redeemed and capacity may not always be available for redemption;
such factors influence the value of loyalty points and are incorporated using modeling ap-
proaches in Su and Zhang (2008) and Cachon and Swinney (2009). The literature has also
studied consumer stockpiling of purchases (Su, 2010, Besbes and Lobel, 2015), which may
be relevant for accumulation of loyalty points, but we do not consider stockpiling in this
paper.
Recently, we are thrilled to see a few papers in the operations literature on the optimal
design of loyalty programs. Sun and Zhang (2015) examine the expiration terms of cus-
tomer reward programs and find that a finite expiration term can increase firm profits, even
without accelerating consumer purchases. Our model does not specify the expiration terms,
so it applies to the airline and hotel industry where unused points can rollover. Chun and
Ovchinnikov (2015) study the customer tier component of loyalty programs (eg, require-
ments to reach gold status), while we focus on the frequency reward component of loyalty
programs (eg, requirements for a free flight). Methodologically, to capture customers’ inter-
temporal decisions, Sun and Zhang (2015) develop a full dynamic programming model,
while Chun and Ovchinnikov(2015) allow customers to choose how many flight to fly over
a year. In contrast, our model simplifies the decision dynamics by incorporating the value
of the loyalty program currency, which is endogenously determined by firm and customers’
strategic behavior.
1.3. Behavioral Evidence of Consumer Model
Fundamentally, loyalty programs create a new option for customers: buying with points.
The starting point for any model-building activity is to understand how customers perceive
this option. Consider a customer who is eligible to redeem for an award. The first question
we address here is to find the plausible model for his redemption behavior.
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At the most basic level, the model will involve (at least) a binary choice between buying
with cash (pay the current price) and buying with points (pay the loyalty points). The goal
of this section is to establish the boundary of a plausible model for that binary decision.
Consider a customer who makes the binary decision: cash or points. It is clear that the
customer chooses to pay points when the current cash price is high and vice versa. Hence,
there is a maximum price that he will pay to keep his points. This maximum price can be
seen as a proxy for the customer’s “value of points”. Note that if the customer chooses to
pay the maximum price, he automatically hoards the points for future purchases. Hence,
the “value of points” hinges on their future purchasing power. The question is how the
customer determines this “purchasing power”. Specifically, we ask the following questions.
What are the metrics the customers rely on for the evaluation of the “purchasing power”?
Is the “purchasing power” determined dynamically or one-shot? In the rest of this section,
we shall discuss each of the two questions separately.
First, intuitively, the “purchasing power of points” should be dependent on the customer’s
expectation about the future prices that these points can redeem for. In fact, there is ample
evidence in the literature supporting this theory. Thaler (1985) proposes that consumers
consider not only the benefits from the good they might buy but also the perceived merits
of the deal: whether the actual price is higher or lower than they expect. Take the airline
industry for example. When travelers decide the time to redeem their frequent flyer miles,
they are not only concerned about the benefit and convenience generated from the flight
ticket, but also whether the purchase is a “good bargain”. In Thaler’s study, participants
imagined sitting on a beach with a friend who had just offered to bring them back a
bottle of their favorite beer. When told that beer would be purchased from a fancy hotel,
participants authorized their friend to spend $2.65, but when told the retailer was a run-
down grocery store, they were willing to pay just $1.50. In other words, the expectation
to pay became the willingness to pay, i.e. the customer’s maximum price to keep the
beer is linked to his expectation to pay in that store.This is referred to as the Reference
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Price Theory (Weaver and Frederick, 2012). In the context of airlines, it is likely that the
customer’s maximum price to keep the points are linked to the customer’s expectation to
pay for a future redeemable flight ticket. If this is true, the effect of expectation (reference
price) should be reflected in customers’ behavior: when the expectation of future prices is
higher, points become more worthy and the maximum price customers pay to keep points
is higher.
Second, the value of points may be determined either dynamically or one-shot. If it is
determined dynamically, it must be state-dependent, i.e. the value of points varies with how
many points the customer has already accumulated. Otherwise, it is state-independent. We
shall discuss each case separately. In our previous airline example, a customer trying to
redeem frequent flyer miles must be aware of the potential trips that he can accumulate
miles from or redeem miles for in the future, and have rational beliefs about their future
utilities and market prices in advance. To fully capture this process, a dynamic program
over multiple periods is required. In each period, the customer may incur a need to take a
flight. In this dynamic program, the customers’ state variable is the amount of miles they
accumulated in their frequent flyer account, and their decision variable is whether to redeem
the miles or pay cash for each trip. Even if a full-fledged dynamic program is implausible, as
long as there is any dynamic consideration (even if imperfectly so), there will be some state
dependence, and decisions will depend on mileage balance. Intuitively, it is quite obvious
that with a higher mileage balance, the customer is more likely to use miles more freely.
On the other hand, evidence suggests that some customers may view the evaluation of points
as a one-shot decision. Specifically, many frequent flyers follow a simple rule of thumb: they
form an implicit estimation of the average value of one mile, and conclude that it is a good
deal to use miles when the value of a mile given the current price exceeds the average value
of a mile. For example, Tripadvisor.com calculated that each mile is worth ¢1.4. This
was derived from dividing the average domestic roundtrip ticket price $350 by the required
25,000 miles. Using this baseline, customers can calculate whether any ticket is worth using
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the miles for. A frequent flyer (Smarttravel) has the following examples: “Cashing in 25,000
miles for a ticket that could be purchased for $100 yields just ¢0.4. On the other hand,
redeeming 100,000 miles for a business-class ticket to Europe priced at almost $11,000 yields
a nominal per-mile value of ¢11, slightly less with the hassle factor adjustment.” Following
this rule of thumb, a customer should purchase the $100 ticket in cash and the $11,000
ticket in miles. Some frequent flyers have developed online spreadsheets to calculate when
to redeem miles, while the exact baseline can be adjusted to different airlines, programs,
or even the customers’ own calibration. Instead of evaluating miles dynamically, customers
stick to a fixed value of miles when making the binary decision. Nevertheless, they are
still strategic in the sense that they balance the tradeoff between using the miles right
away (which gives a value of ¢0.4 cent and ¢11 cents per mile in the previous examples
respectively), and hoarding the miles for later use (which yields an expected value of ¢1.4
per mile). Note that the Tripadvisor.com example not only supports the one-shot evaluation
hypothesis, but also echoes the reference theory: the evaluation of points depends on the
average price $350 of a flight ticket, which sets customers’ expectation of the future price.
Both the “reference price” theory and the “dynamic vs one-shot” hypotheses are plausible,
we need to run a study. In the study, we shall test whether the customers’ redemption
decisions are price-dependent (reference theory) and state-dependent (dynamic vs one-shot).
Experiment Design Participants (N = 510) were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
They were asked to complete a survey. In the beginning of the survey, they answered the
screening question whether they are members of any frequent flyer programs. Then they
considered the hypothetical situation to choose a flight destination that they would like to
redeem using miles. They were first told the following: “Imagine that you have accumulated
enough miles for a free round-trip flight anywhere in the continental US. Where is your
most likely destination?” Choosing the destination initially pins down the flight before any
manipulations come in.
They then examined the option to pay the average cash price for the chosen flight. In the
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high (low) average price segment, participants were asked: “Next, imagine that a trusted
friend familiar with airlines tells you that the average price of a round-trip flight is $800
($300). If you did not have any miles, are you willing to pay $800 ($300) for this flight?”
Finally, they examined the options between paying cash and redeeming miles for the flight.
They were given information about their mileage balance (200,000 or 50,000), the average
price of the redeemable flight ($800 or $300 as in the previous question), and the current
price (ranging from $0 to $1000 with increment of $100), which might differ from the average
price. In the high (low) average price/mileage balance group, participants are asked “You
have 200,000 (50,000) miles in your account and you can use 25,000 miles to pay for the
flight. The average price for the flight is $800 ($300) but the actual price you find might
be higher or lower. At each price below, do you prefer to pay money or use miles?” The
participants then chose from a list of current prices and identified the maximum price they
would like to pay to keep their miles, i.e. their willingness to pay for the miles (WTP).
Specifically, the midpoint of the two prices where the customer switched from “money” to
“miles” is used to calculate WTP.
Therefore, the experiment should be able to answer the following question related to the
binary decision: whether it is state-dependent and subject to reference-price effects.
Results We restrict our analysis on 244 participants who responded that they were en-
rolled in some frequent flyer programs. These participants have had previous experience
with the accumulation and redemption of loyalty points and their behavior will most reflect
the loyalty program members’ decisions in practice. The key statistics are summarized in
Table 1:
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Table 1: Summary of Statistics
Group G1 G2 G3 G4
Average Price $800 $300 $800 $300
Mileage Balance 200k 200k 50k 50k
Number of Participants 60 64 59 61
Average WTP $413.3 $306.3 $428.8 $342.6
Standard Deviation $182.7 $154.2 $170.2 $133.5
Figure 1: Willingness to Pay
First, we find strong evidence of the reference effects. We conduct two t-tests on WTP
between the $800 and $300 average price segments. Across the 200k mileage balance groups,
the p-value is 0.0006 (t = 3.5157, df = 115.757); across the 50k mileage balance groups, the
p-value is 0.0026 (t = 3.0795, df = 109.918). Both suggest strong statistical difference in
customers’ WTP.
Second, we do not observe evidence of state-dependent decisions. Similarly, we conduct t-
tests between the 200k and 50k mileage balance segments, across the $800 and $300 average
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price groups separately. The p-values are 0.6333 (t = -0.4783, df = 116.665) and 0.1605 (t
= -1.412, df = 121.897), showing no significant effects of mileage balances.
Finally, we run a regression with all demographic information controlled (gender, age, fre-
quent flyer program, true mileage balance, travel frequency, etc.). The effect of average
price on WTP is significant (p=6.62e-06); by increasing the average price from $300 to
$800, the WTP increased by $97.453. However, the effect of mileage balance is not statis-
tically significant (p=0.1058).
Consumer Behavior Model Based on the evidence, we need to incorporate the follow-
ing properties of consumer decisions when building a coherent model: i) consumers evaluate
points in a one-shot manner; ii) consumers evaluate points according to their expectations
of future prices. We shall describe the consumer behavioral model briefly below.
Consider a loyalty program member i who has accumulated enough points to redeem a free
unit that he evaluates at vi. He chooses between the following three options: i) pay the
current cash price p and earn N points (I); ii) use M points to redeem for a free unit (A);
iii) leave the market (O).
The customer then evaluates points as a one-shot decision. We shall use w as the value of
a point. Then the customer’s utility from a purchase is
u(I) = vi +Nw − p,
from a redemption is
u(A) = vi −Mw,
from leaving the market is exactly 0. The customer compares these three options and
determines a preference rule denoted by ai.
Finally, we describe how the value of loyalty points w depends on the firm’s and customers’
decisions. The empirical study suggests strong effect of reference price, i.e. customers
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evaluate points according to the average price of an award. We will incorporate that into
our model. Specifically, We characterize the market value of a point as
w =
R · σ
M
,
where R is the market value of an award unit, σ is the probability that each point will
eventually be redeemed, and M is the number of miles required for an award. The market
value R is the net price at the time of redemption: i.e., if the prevailing price at the time
of redemption is p˜, then the market value of the award unit is p˜ − Nw; we subtract Nw
where N is the average number of points issued to customers with a cash-paid purchase.
The setup is consistent with the reference price (p˜) effects. The redemption probability σ
is simply the ratio of the average number of redeemed points over the average number of
issued points. (For example, if an airline issues twice as many miles as are redeemed, then
the chances that each mile will be redeemed is 50% on average.)
Note that the value R depends on the firm’s pricing decisions, while the value σ depends
on the firm’s award capacity decisions. Hence, the value of a point w is endogenous. In the
next section, we will describe the firm’s model in detail.
1.4. Firm’s Model and Equilibrium
Our model builds on Littlewood’s (1972) model of quantity-based revenue management.
In the classic model, there is a firm that sells a fixed capacity of K units over two time
periods. In period one, the firm faces an infinite population of low-type customers, each
with valuation vL for a unit of capacity. In period two, the firm faces a random population
of X ∼ F (·) high-type customers, each with valuation vH , where vH > vL. The firm sells
qL units to low-types and reserves qH units for high-types, where qL + qH = K. Given the
decision above, the expected profit is vL ·qL+vH ·E[qH ∧X], which demonstrates a tradeoff
between the guaranteed but lower revenue from low-types and the higher but uncertain
revenue from high-types. The profit-maximizing decision, known as Littlewood’s rule, is
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q0H = min{K, q¯}, where q¯ = F¯−1( vLvH ). We use q0H , q0L, pi0 to denote the optimal decisions
and profit in the classic model.
Loyalty Program Now, we introduce loyalty programs into Littlewood’s setting. Assume
that with loyalty programs, the firm charges prices pL and pH to low and high types. For
each unit purchased at pi, the firm issues Ni loyalty points to the customer; once a customer
accumulates Mi points, the customer may redeem those points for a free unit priced at pi,
i = L,H.
This general setup is applicable to the three types of loyalty programs of interest: volume-
based programs, expense-based programs, and point-based programs. For example, in a
volume-based program (old AAdvantage) that issues 5,030 miles for a round-trip US coast-
to-coast flight and requires 25,000 miles for a free flight, we have NL = NH = 5, 030 and
ML = MH = 25, 000. In an expense-based program (new AAdvantage) that issues 5 miles
for every dollar spent by a customer and requires 25,000 miles for a free flight, we have
Ni = 5 · pi, i = L,H and ML = MH = 25, 000. In a point-based program (Southwest Rapid
Rewards) that issues 6 miles for every dollar spent by a customer and requires 70 miles for
every dollar redeemed by a customer, we have Ni = 6 · pi and Mi = 70 · pi, i = L,H.
We consider a setting where the firm sells the same capacity of K units repeatedly over time.
In the airline example, miles earned on a current flight may be redeemed for a future flight.
Nonetheless, each individual flight is managed similarly to the classic model as described
below.
Firm Decisions With loyalty programs, the firm divides the capacity of K units into
three instead of two pools. As before, the firm chooses a protection level qH (number of
units to reserve for high-types) and a booking limit qL (number of units to sell to low-types),
but now the firm also sets aside qA units for award redemption. We use q = (qA, qL, qH) to
denote the capacity allocation decision, where the three components are nonnegative and
add up to K. In addition, the firm chooses prices pL and pH to charge to low and high
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types, and we denote p = (pL, pH). The firm’s objective, as before, is to maximize total
expected profit.
Profit Function Having specified the firm’s decisions (p, q) and customers’ preference
rules a = (aL, aH), we are now ready to write down the profit function:
pi(p, q, a) = pL · sL(q, a) + pH · sH(q, a),
where sL and sH denote the expected number of units sold at the two prices. The former
is sL = qL if low-types buy and zero otherwise. The latter is sH = E[qH ∧X] if high-types
buy before redemption, sH = E[qH ∧ (X − qA)+] if high-types buy after redemption, and
zero otherwise. Finally, we also use sA(q, a) to denote the expected number of award units
redeemed, even though they do not contribute to revenue and thus do not enter the profit
function directly. There are four possible values for sA: if no customers redeem, sA = 0; if
low types redeem, sA = qA; if high types redeem as their first choice, sA = E[qA ∧ X]; if
high types redeem after purchases, sA = E[qA ∧ (X − qH)+]. Given sL, sH and sA, we can
express the redemption probability as follows
σ(p, q, a) =
MsA
NLsL +NHsH
,
as before, M is the average number of points charged for a redemption.
Timeline and Equilibrium The chronology of events is as follows. First, the firm
chooses a revenue management strategy (p, q), which is observed by all. Then, low-types
arrive and choose their preference rule aL; this is followed by sales to and/or redemptions
by low-types, after which they leave the market. Finally, high-type demand X is realized,
they observe the entire history and choose their preference rule aH , and then sales to and
redemptions by high-types occur. Given this timeline, we use backward induction to solve
for the sub-game perfect equilibria, which can be defined as follows.
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Definition An equilibrium (p∗, q∗, a∗) satisfies the following conditions.
1. (Customer optimality) Given any (p, q), customers choose a∗(p, q) to maximize utility.
2. (Firm optimality) The firm chooses (p∗, q∗) to maximize expected profit:
p∗, q∗ = arg maxpi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) (1)
1.5. Volume-Based Loyalty Programs
We first consider volume-based programs. In such programs, the firm issues the same num-
ber of points to each purchase and requires the same number of points for each redemption,
regardless of the prices. For simplicity, we shall denote N = NL = NH and M = ML = MH .
By solving the customers’ and firm’s problems, we characterize the equilibrium below.
Proposition 1. In the equilibrium,
(i) Low types buy q∗L, then redeem q
∗
A; high types buy q
∗
H .
(ii) p∗i = vi +Nw
∗;
(iii) There exists K¯ such that
(a) if K ≤ K¯, then q∗L = 0 and q∗A, q∗H satisfy
q∗A + q
∗
H = K, q
∗
A =
σ∗N
M
E[q∗H ∧X].
(b) If K > K¯, then q∗H = q and q
∗
A, q
∗
L satisfy
q∗A + q
∗
L + q = K, q
∗
A =
σ∗N
M
{q∗L + E[q ∧X]}.
Here, q = F¯−1( p
∗
L−c
p∗H−c) and c =
σ∗N
M+σ∗N pL.
19
(iv) The equilibrium profit is vL · q∗L + vH · q∗A + vH · E[q∗H ∧X].
(v) R∗ = vH , σ∗ = vLvH , w
∗ = vLM .
Proposition 1(i) summarizes equilibrium customer behavior (Figure 1). First, low types
prefer to pay the low price but are willing to redeem awards when the low-price capacity
runs out; this is intuitive because at sufficiently low prices, customers would seize the deal
and save points for future use. Second, high types are willing to pay the high price. Hence,
the following sequence of events occur in equilibrium: 1) upon arrival, low types purchase
at the low price pL; 2) low-price capacity qL runs out, so the prevailing price rises to pH ; 3)
low types who have not received a unit redeem awards using their points; 4) award capacity
qA runs out, 5) all remaining low types leave the market; 6) high types arrive and buy at the
high price. Given this chronology, the prevailing price is the high price when redemptions
occur, so it is not surprising that the market value of awards is R∗ = vH as indicated in
Proposition 1(iv).
Figure 2: Equilibrium Timeline
Next, we discuss the firm’s equilibrium decisions. As shown in Proposition 1(ii), the firm
selects prices p∗i = vi + Nw
∗ to extract maximum customer surplus. The prices consist of
two parts: the value of the unit (vi) and the value of issued points (Nw
∗). With these prices,
Proposition 1(iii) then summarizes the equilibrium capacity allocation q∗. To understand
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this result, we first introduce a critical fractile q. We can rewrite the equation of q as follows:
(p∗H − c)F¯ (q) = p∗L − c.
This is similar to the critical fractile q¯ used in Littlewood’s rule in our baseline model: the
left hand side is the expected revenue from reserving an additional unit for the high type
customers; the right hand side is the certain revenue from giving this unit to the low types.
However, there is an additional cost c associated with the revenues. This is the cost of
issuing points. For each unit sold, the firm issues N points, each of which is redeemed with
probability σ∗ for 1M unit of capacity. In other words, each sold unit is associated with the
liability of fulfilling σ
∗N
M units worth of loyalty rewards. Altogether, the firm needs a total
of 1 + σ
∗N
M units to sell to and award the customer, and the awarded capacity is a fraction
σ∗N
M+σ∗N of this total capacity. For each unit of awarded capacity, there is an opportunity
cost of p∗L: if this unit is not awarded, then it can be sold to a low type customer at price
p∗L. Hence, the liability of issuing points is c =
σ∗N
M+σ∗N p
∗
L.
Using the critical fractile q, we can interpret the optimal capacity allocation q∗ in Propo-
sition 1. The critical fractile q can be viewed as a protection level for high-type demand.
Protecting q units for high-types generates a total of NE[q ∧X] points and a correspond-
ing award liability of σ
∗N
M E[q ∧X] units. If the award liability exceeds remaining capacity
K − q, as in case (i), the firm does not sell at the low price (i.e., q∗L = 0) and lowers the
protection level q∗H below q so that the corresponding award liability can be covered by
available capacity K. In case (ii), the protection level q∗H = q and the corresponding award
liability do not take up the entire capacity K. Then, the remaining capacity is allocated
to low-price capacity q∗L and the corresponding award liability
σ∗N
M q
∗
L. In other words, we
have q∗L +
σ∗N
M q
∗
L + q +
σ∗N
M E[q ∧X] = K, as indicated in the proposition.
Finally, Proposition 1(iv) gives the equilibrium profit, which is similar to the expected
profit vL · q∗L + vH ·E[q∗H ∧X] in the classic model, but has an additional term vH · q∗A. This
additional term suggests that the firm receives vH from each redeemed unit. Even though
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the firm does not receive revenue from award redemptions, it can charge a price premium
for issuing loyalty points. When the price premium is accounted for, it is as if the firm sells
award units at the high-type valuation vH to low-type customers. In other words, when low
types redeem awards, the firm effectively uses its loyalty program to extract the high-type
valuation vH from these low-type customers. This follows directly from the reference effects:
low types refer the value of points according to the price at the redemption.
This result echoes the current accounting protocols of loyalty programs. Under the “De-
ferred Revenue” accounting criterion, firms are required to defer the revenue associated
with issued points to the point of redemption. The most prevailing way of calculating the
deferred revenue is by the “fare value” of the redeemable reward, i.e., the price at which the
award is redeemed. Put it in a simple way, the firm recognizes a revenue equivalent to the
current price at the redemption point, and this revenue must have been be deducted/de-
ferred previously at the time of issuing these points. This is exactly what Proposition 1(iv)
indicates: instead of recognizing the whole revenue pi when selling qi and 0 for rewarding
qA, the firm can record vi for qi, recognize an additional revenue for qA, and yield the same
total revenue.
To induce these low types to redeem points, Proposition 1(v) ensures that the redemption
probability is below a limit vLvH , i.e., the chances that points can eventually be used are low
enough that low types are better off redeeming instead of hoarding them. Ultimately, the
constraint in (2) determines the amount of capacity the firm should reserve for awards: qA
should be increased to the point where the redemption rate reaches the upper limit.
In summary, loyalty programs enhance profits by extracting high revenues from low types.
The revenue management strategy must be adjusted to account for the cost and benefit of
issuing points. Specifically, the redemption probability under the optimal revenue manage-
ment strategy has to be low to prevent customers from hoarding points for future use.
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1.6. Expense-Based Loyalty Programs
The previous section investigates volume-based loyalty programs, under which customers
receive the same number of points from each purchase, no matter how much they pay.
In practice, some companies use expense-based programs, under which customers receive
points based on the amount of money they spend. This section extends our results to
expense-based programs.
Consider American Airlines that provides an expense-based loyalty program: it issues 5
miles for each dollar spent and requires 25,000 miles for a free flight. Then, the total
number of points issued per unit depends on the price paid. For instance, a customer gets
4,000 miles for a ticket priced at $800, but only gets 1,500 miles for a ticket discounted
to $300 on the same flight. Let n be the number of points issued per dollar spent; here,
n = 5. As before, we use M to denote the number of points required for a free unit; in our
example, M = 25, 000, so customers are entitled to a free flight after spending $5,000 (e.g.,
7 full-fare flights or 17 discounted flights). This results in Ni = npi and Mi = M , where
i = L,H.
With expense-based loyalty programs, most of our results remain unchanged. We begin
with the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the equilibrium,
(i) Low types buy q∗L, then redeem q
∗
A; high types buy q
∗
H .
(ii) p∗i =
vi
1−nw∗ ;
(iii) There exists K¯ such that
(a) if K ≤ K¯, then q∗L = 0 and q∗A, q∗H satisfy
q∗A + q
∗
H = K, q
∗
A =
σ∗np∗H
M
E[q∗H ∧X].
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(b) If K > K¯, then q∗H = q and q
∗
A, q
∗
L satisfy
q∗A + q
∗
L + q¯ = K, q
∗
A =
σ∗np∗L
M
q∗L +
σ∗np∗H
M
E[q¯ ∧X].
Here, q¯ = F¯−1( vLvH ).
(iv) The equilibrium profit is vL · q∗L + vH · q∗A + vH · E[q∗H ∧X];
(v) R∗ = vH , σ∗ = vLvH , w
∗ = vLM .
A quick glance at Proposition 2 reveals several similarities to Proposition 1. First, Proposi-
tion 2(i) shows that with expense-based programs, it remains optimal to induce low-types to
buy before redeeming, resulting in awards being valued at the high valuation, i.e., R∗ = vH ,
as in volume-based programs. Second, the profit function in Proposition 2(iv) remains un-
changed and shows that, by extracting a price premium for loyalty points, the firm again
receives vH from each of the qA redeemed units. In other words, whether they are volume-
based or expense-based, loyalty programs enable the firm to extract the high valuation
from each unit redeemed by a low-type. Finally, Proposition 2(v) shows that the redemp-
tion probability σ∗ = vLvH and the value of loyalty points w
∗ = vLM match our earlier results
for volume-based programs.
However, there are a couple of differences between Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. First,
to extract all consumer surplus, the firm chooses p∗i = vi + np
∗
iw, which gives p
∗
i =
vi
1−nw∗ .
As a result, the price premium for loyalty points enters as a multiplicative factor 11−nw∗
in expense-based programs, instead of an additive term Nw∗ in volume-based programs.
Second, the exact form of revenue management decisions differ from volume-based programs.
Nevertheless, the optimal capacity allocation rule for expense-based programs follows the
same logic as before. We start with a protection level q¯ for high-types, a` la Littlewood. If
this protection level and the associated award liability exceeds capacity, then all units are
priced high and the protection level is adjusted downward to meet capacity. Otherwise,
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the firm protects q∗H = q¯ units for high-types and additionally allocates q
∗
L units for sale at
the low price so that all capacity is used up, after considering all associated award liability.
Consequently, the rule of thumb described in the previous section still applies: the optimal
award capacity can be achieved by matching the redemption probability to σ∗.
One noteworthy result in Proposition 2 is that the protection level q¯ is identical to that
in the classic model. This is because in expense-based loyalty programs, both the price
premium and the cost of issuing points are proportional to the valuation of the customer
who made the purchase. As a result, the critical fractile q¯ determining the protection level
is simply the ratio of customer valuations, as in the classic model. This finding leads us
to our next result. The result suggests that Expense-based programs not only retains the
property of inducing low types to pay the high price, but also simplifies the calculation of
revenue management. An expense-based program protects the same number of units for
high-types as in the classic Littlewood model, suggesting that capacity allocation decisions
can be made without considering loyalty programs. The firm only needs to collect historical
information about prices to make decisions on the protection levels.
1.7. Point-Based Loyalty Programs
In the previous section, we considered price-dependent issuance of loyalty points. In this
section, we investigate price-dependent issuance and redemption in point-based programs.
In such programs, for every unit priced at pi, a cash-paying customer earns npi points,
and a point-paying customer pays mpi points, i.e., Ni = npi and Mi = mpi. Point-based
programs have been adopted by Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airlines.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium,
(i) Low types redeem q∗A, then buy q
∗
L; high types buy q
∗
H .
(ii) p∗i =
vi
1−nw∗ ;
(iii) There exists K¯ such that
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(a) If K ≤ K¯, then q∗L = 0 and q∗A, q∗H satisfy
q∗A + q
∗
H = K, q
∗
A =
σ∗n
m
E[q∗H ∧X].
(b) If K > K¯, then q∗H = q¯ and q
∗
A, q
∗
L satisfy
q∗A + q
∗
L + q¯ = K, q
∗
A ∈ [0,
n
m
(q∗L +
vH
vL
E[q¯ ∧X])].
Here, q¯ = F¯−1( vLvH ).
(iv) The equilibrium profit is vH · q∗A + vH ·E[q∗H ∧X] if K ≤ K¯, is vL · q∗L + vH ·E[q∗H ∧X]
otherwise.
(v) R∗ = vH , σ∗ = vLvH , w
∗ = vLvLn+vHm if K ≤ K¯; R∗ = vL, σ∗ ≤ 1, w∗ = σ
∗
σ∗n+m
otherwise.
Proposition 3 reveals several unique properties of point-based programs. First, customers
always prefer redeeming awards rather than paying cash. When the number of points
needed for redemption is proportional to the cash price, there is a fixed conversion rate
between points and cash. Therefore, customers have no incentives to hoard points for
future redemptions and they will always use points whenever an award unit is available.
Second, Proposition 3(iv) suggests that the firm can only extract the high value from award
capacity when it fully closes the low price capacity. Note that low types always redeem
before purchasing. If the low price capacity is offered, when customers redeem, the prevailing
price is low and they evaluate points according to the that price. Hence, the firm cannot
extract high values from issuing points to them. On the contrary, if the low price capacity
is closed, they can only redeem at the high price and points have high values. Therefore,
only when the low price capacity is closed do redemptions eventually generate high values
for the firm.
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Finally, Proposition 3(iii) and (v) indicate that when the firm opens up some low price
capacity, it becomes more flexible in choosing the award capacity qA. Specifically, the limit
on the redemption probability of points is extended to be as high as 100%. Previously,
in volume-based and expense-based programs, the firm needs to restrict the redemption
probability below 100% to induce immediate redemptions by customers. Now in point-
based programs, customers never hoard points for future use. As a result, the firm can
allow 100% redemption probabilities. Moreover, since now redemptions happen at the low
price, they generate exactly the same revenues as the low price capacity. Indifferent between
selling and rewarding the low types, the firm has a more flexible rewarding rule, i.e. it can
split the Littlewood booking limit K − q¯ arbitrarily between the award capacity qA and
low price capacity qL, as long as the redemption rate is below 100%. Specifically, the 100%
redemption probability can be optimal. In such cases, the firm does not need to distinguish
between cash-paying customers and reward customers. Instead, the firm can put them in
the same booking bucket. Consequently, a customer can always redeem an award whenever
the unit of capacity can be purchased using cash. Our result is consistent with practice - the
100% availability rate is exactly what the highly-praised point-based programs of Southwest
Airlines and JetBlue Airlines are well-known of.
1.8. Numerical Examples
In this section, we will provide some numerical examples to clarify the mechanics of the
revenue management strategies. Our primary data source is Airline Origin and Destination
Survey (DB1B) conducted by Bureau of Transportation Statistics. It is a 10% sample of
airline tickets from reporting carriers. Data includes origin, destination, price and other
itinerary details of passengers transported.
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Figure 3: Price Distribution
We select 16 routes over the third quarter of 2015 across four airlines for analysis. At
that period of time, American Airlines offers a mileage-based (volume-based) program,
both United Airlines and Delta Airlines offers an expense-based program, and Southwest
Airlines offers a point-based program. All these routes are direct flights, with a market
share of non-stop passengers greater than 70% (mostly 100%) such that competition is
rare. The following approaches are used for model calibrations: (i) the number of standard
economy class seats on the plane is used for capacity K; (ii) the first quantile price is used
to calibrate low valuation vL and third quantile price is used to calibrate high valuation vH
(See Figure 3. The two red lines corresponds to the first quantile and third quantile price.
Data suggests that the first quantile price has the highest density in the price distribution,
which may approximate a mass probability of low type customers; we understands that
such simplifications of the valuation distribution have limitations, but hope to proceed with
the numerical examples to generate insights of the theoretical model); (iii) a quarter of
the economy class seats is used for the mean of the high type demand, i.e. E[X] = K/4,
since only 25% of all passengers paid the high value price vH ; (iv) we assume X follows the
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normal distribution, with coefficient of variation ranging from 0.5 to 2; (v) the award policy
for United and Delta is used to calibrate Ni and Mi in both the volume-based and expense-
based programs, while the award policy for Southwest is used to calibrate for point-based
programs; (vi) we use the fraction of tickets sold under $25 as the fraction of award tickets
(illustrated in blue dashed line in Figure 3), and multiply that by K for the award space
qA in practice (the tax paid for redemption ranges from $5 to $10, and the probability of
paid price between $10 and $25 is less than 1%).
Table 2 summarizes the results of the 16 routes, by calculating the optimal RM strategies
and profit improvements of loyalty programs (∆Π). The routes are listed in ascending
order of flying distance. Note that there is a pattern of increasing ∆Π of the volume-based
program and a decreasing-increasing ∆Π of the expense-based program. We will discuss
three routes in detail below.
(1) BOS - CVG (Delta): Table 2 has three implications. First, it indicates that Delta is
better off with the expense-based program for this route. Because of the high price and
short distance of the route, an expense-based program issues more miles to customers
compared to the mileage-based programs. Since each mile yields high valuations, the
airline can benefit from “selling” these miles to customers. Second, Delta Airlines
over-reward its customers under the expense-based program. While it gives 7.6 seats
to its award passengers, the optimal reward level is only around 5.8. This can be
due to the simple approximation of demand distribution. Finally, although the point-
based program does not generate higher revenues directly, it can significantly enhance
award space and potentially lead to higher customer satisfaction. (The same logic
applies to Route (2) - (6).)
(15) SFO to CLT (American): compared to Route (1), Route (15) has much longer dis-
tance. As a result, a mileage based program issues more miles to customers. For this
specific route, American Airlines benefit from its mileage-based programs more, since
putting more miles into circulation allows the firm to gain higher profits. In fact, the
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number of capacity rewarded to customers (3.1 seats) is close to the optimal level
in the model (2.8 seats). Finally, note that although the mileage-based program is
slightly better, the expense-based program also enhances the profits over 5.7%. (The
same logic applies to Route (7) - (16).)
(9) DAL to PHL (Southwest): this is a medium-haul flight. As in the case of flight (15),
the volume-based program is more profitable. However, the point-based program
allows significantly more award space, thus Southwest is able to apply a simple rule
of thumb: treat award customers exactly the same as cash passengers. Note that the
qA in data is greater than the optimal qA under the point-based program. This may
be due to two reasons: (i) biased sample of the price distribution; (ii) the ratio of
award redemptions is relatively lower in other routes, to make up for the additional
redeemed miles in this specific route.
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Table 2: Numerical Examples
Route Data Littlewood Volume-based Expense-based Point-based
Distance vL vH K qA Market% qH qA qH ∆Π qA qH ∆Π qA qH ∆Π
(1) DL: BOS - CVG 187 240 503 108 7.6 100% 28.6 0.7 28.4 0.6% 5.8 28.6 5.3% 10.9 28.6 0%
(2) AA: MIA - MCO 192 117 249 108 3.0 100% 29.0 0.7 29.0 0.7% 2.7 29.0 2.5% 11.0 29.0 0%
(3) WN: HOU - DAL 239 85 195 143 7.5 100% 41.5 1.1 41.3 0.8% 2.5 41.5 2.0% 14.9 41.5 0%
(4) UA: DCA -CLE 310 203 411 44 5.0 100% 11.2 0.5 11.1 1.0% 2.0 11.2 4.2% 4.4 11.2 0%
(5) DL: MSP -CLE 622 244 447 120 9.3 100% 26.5 3.0 26.1 1.9% 7.1 26.5 4.6% 11.6 26.5 0%
(6) DL: JFK - ATL 760 181 335 108 10.5 95% 24.3 3.2 23.8 2.4% 4.6 24.3 3.4% 10.5 24.3 0%
(7) WN: DAL - MSP 853 75 150 143 20.0 100% 35.8 4.4 35.0 2.8% 2.4 35.8 1.5% 14.2 35.8 0%
(8) WN: HOU - SLC 1214 172 217 143 19.9 100% 6.6 10.1 6.2 1.9% 7.9 6.6 1.4% 13.2 6.6 0%
(9) WN: DAL - PHL 1295 112 195 175 17.7 100% 35.5 9.3 34.4 3.7% 4.8 35.5 1.9% 16.8 35.5 0%
(10) UA: PHX - IAD 1956 219 503 90 14.0 91% 26.2 5.2 25.1 6.5% 4.1 26.2 5.2% 9.4 26.2 0%
(11) DL: SEA - CVG 1965 262 480 132 17.5 100% 29.2 9.8 27.9 5.9% 8.4 29.2 5.0% 12.8 29.2 0%
(12) DL: EWR - SLC 1969 245 397 120 9.2 100% 21.1 10.2 20.1 5.0% 7.8 21.1 3.9% 11.3 21.1 0%
(13) DL: DTW - LAX 1979 247 577 108 14.0 75% 31.9 6.2 30.5 6.6% 5.6 31.9 6.0% 11.3 31.9 0%
(14) AA: SEA - CLT 2279 275 500 138 11.9 100% 30.3 11.9 28.8 7.0% 9.2 30.3 5.2% 13.4 30.3 0%
(15) AA: SFO - CLT 2296 274 540 36 3.1 100% 8.8 2.8 8.4 7.1% 2.3 8.8 5.7% 3.6 8.8 0%
(16) UA: EWR -LAX 2454 236 527 108 16.5 78% 30.5 8.0 28.9 8.0% 5.5 30.5 5.5% 11.1 30.5 0%
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Figure 4: Profit Benefit of Loyalty Programs (Unit: %)
Finally, we plot the six high-fare routes (with a low price ranging from $240 to $274) in
Figure 4. The horizontal axis is the high price vH , and the vertical axis is the flying
distance. The contour lines indicate the percentage of profit improvement of volume-based
and expense-based programs over the classic Littlewood model. Moreover, the shaded areas
suggests that expense-based programs are more profitable than volume-based programs.
In Figure 4, as the flying distance increases or high price increases, the loyalty programs
become more profitable. This is because the firm is able to issue more miles in such scenarios.
Specifically, the volume-based program is more profitable than the expense-based when the
flying distance is longer, as for the four routes above the line. In contrast, for short-haul
expensive flights (bottom Delta routes), expense-based programs are more profitable.
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1.9. Conclusions
In this paper, we study loyalty programs in industries such as airlines and hotels where
capacity is limited. Starting with Littlewood’s classic revenue management model with two
customer types (e.g., leisure and business travelers, representing low-paying and high-paying
types), we incorporate loyalty rewards (i.e., non-paying types) and obtain the following re-
sults. First, loyalty points lead to adjustment of revenue management decisions by including
the liability of points. Second, optimal award capacity is constrained by quantity sold un-
der fixed redemption of points, but the 100% award availability can be optimal when the
number of redeemed points is proportional to the price of the award. Finally, we compared
the three different programs schemes: volume-based and expense-based programs extract
high values from low type customers; expense-based programs simplifies the calculation of
revenue management; point-based programs allow 100% award availability.
This research can be extended in several directions. First, just as how Littlewood’s original
model was generalized to multiple demand classes, which led to the development of heuristics
and algorithms for practical implementation (e.g., Belobaba, 1998), our methods can be
extended to more general demand patterns. Second, although we have focused on the
frequency rewards component of loyalty programs, most programs in practice also have
the customer tier component that offer precious metal status as incentives. Considering
both components at the same time may uncover interesting interactions (e.g., Kopalle,
2012). Third, loyalty program transactions are closely related to the finance and accounting
functions of the firm. It is interesting to study firms’ flexibility in reporting loyalty rewards
and the corresponding regulatory implications (see related work by Chun et al., 2015). We
hope that our suggestions above will motivate further work on revenue management with
loyalty programs.
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1.10. Appendix: Proofs
First we shall formulate consumers’ decisions. Each type-i customer may pay the price
pi (I), redeem a free award unit (A) or leave the market (O). Customers indicate their
preferences by choosing ai ∈ {O, I,A, IA,AI}. In the last two options, the customer is
open to both redeeming and buying: if ai = IA, the customer prefers paying cash and uses
points only when units for sale run out; if ai = AI, the customer resorts to paying cash
only after award capacity runs out. We denote a = (aL, aH).
Proof of Proposition 1. Before solving for the equilibrium, we eliminate a couple of domi-
nated or unreasonable strategies:
• Eliminate pricing strategies p in which pi > vi + Nw. If pi > vi + Nw, type i will
never buy products at pi. There is no need to create two prices. This is the same as
setting qi = 0 for some i ∈ L,H.
• Eliminate value of a point w that w > vH/M . If w > vH/M , then u(A) = vi−Mw <
0 = u(Q), no one redeems. Then redemption probability σ = 0, we must have w = 0.
Therefore, we shall assume pi ≤ vi +Nw and w ≤ vH/M .
We use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium. The proof consists of 2 steps.
1. Customers’ best responses. A type i customer’ utility from purchasing is u(I) =
vi + Nw − pi, given pi ≤ vi + Nw, we have u(I) ≥ 0. Thus the customers’ strategy
space is reduced to a ∈ {I, IA,AI}. His utility from redemption is u(A) = vi −Mw.
There are four possible customer behavior: (a) if pL ≥ (M + N)w, then a∗L = AL,
a∗H = AH/HA, low types first redeem qA then buy qL, high types buy qH ; (b) if
pL ≤ (M +N)w and Mw ≤ vL, then a∗L = LA, a∗H = AH/HA, low types first buy qL
then redeem qA, high types buy qH ; (c) if pL ≤ (M +N)w ≤ pH and Mw > vL, then
a∗L = L, a
∗
H = AH, low types buy qL, high types first redeem qA then buy qH ; (d) if
(M +N)w ≥ pH , then a∗L = L, a∗H = HA, low types buy qL, high types first buy qH
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then redeem qA.
2. Firm’s optimal strategy. The firm can use (p, q) to generate different values of w, and
induce the four types of customer behavior as described above. In each case, we can
derive the closed form functions of pi, R and σ.
(a) If pL ≥ (M + N)w, pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧ X]pH , R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) =
pL −Nw, σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = MqAN(qL+E[qH∧X]) .
(b) If pL ≤ (M + N)w and Mw ≤ vL, pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧ X]pH ,
R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = pH −Nw, σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = MqAN(qL+E[qH∧X]) .
(c) If pL ≤ (M +N)w ≤ pH and Mw > vL, pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧ (X −
qA)
+]pH , R(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = pH −Nw, σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = ME[qA∧X]N(qL+E[qH∧(X−qA)+]) .
(d) if (M + N)w ≥ pH , pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧ X]pH , R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) =
pH −Nw, σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = ME[qA∧(X−qH)
+]
N(qL+E[qH∧X]) .
We next show that (b) dominates (a), (c) and (d). First, we prove that in case (a),
(c) and (d), the optimal profit is smaller than the case without LP (pi0). Note that
Mw = Rσ, where σ = MsAN(sL+sH) . This gives Nw(sL + sH) = RsA. Plug this in the
profit function we have
pi =
∑
i=L,H pisi
≤∑i=L,H(vi +Nw)si
=
∑
i=L,H visi +RsA
For case (a), R = pL −Nw ≤ vL, so pi ≤ maxq vL(qA + qL) + vHE[qH ∧X] = pi0. For
case (c) and (d), R = pH−Nw ≤ vH . Thus, pi ≤ maxq vLqL+vHE[(qH+qA)∧X] = pi0.
Second, we prove that (b) gives a higher profit than pi0. We plug the corresponding
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pi, σ and R into (1):
maxp,q pi(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧X]pH
s.t. Mw = (pH −Nw) MqAN(qL+E[qH∧X])
pH ≤ vH +Nw
pL ≤ (M +N)w
Mw ≤ vL
qA + qL + qH ≤ K
The first constraint is from the definition of w, the second to fourth constraints are to
induce the corresponding customer behavior, and the last constraint is from limited
capacity. We can think of w as a new decision variable for the firm that is subject to
these constraints.
We show that the optimal solutions have p∗i = vi + Nw
∗, w∗ = vLM . Using Kuhn-
Tucker method, let L = qLpL +E[qH ∧X]pH + λ(Mw− (pH −Nw) MqAN(qL+E[qH∧X]))−
µ(pH − vH − Nw) − η(pL − (M + N)w) − α(Mw − vL) − β(qA + qL + qH − K),
where µ, η, α, β ≥ 0. Then ∂L∂qA = 0 suggests λ < 0. ∂L∂pH = 0 suggests µH > 0, by
complementary slackness, pH = vH+Nw;
∂L
∂pL
= 0 suggests ηL > 0, by complementary
slackness, pL = (M +N)w. The program becomes
maxp,q,w pi(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = qLMw + E[qH ∧X]vH + qAvH
s.t. vHqA = N(qL + E[qH ∧X])w
Mw ≤ vL
qA + qL + qH ≤ K
The new Lagrangian is L = qLMw+E[qH ∧X]vH + qAvH −λ(vHqA−N(qL +E[qH ∧
X])w)−α(Mw−vL)−β(qA+qL+qH−K). ∂L∂qL = Mw+λuw−β, ∂L∂qA = vH−λvH−β,
∂L
∂qL
= ∂L∂qA = 0 gives λ =
vH−Mw
vH−Nw > 0.
∂L
∂w = 0 suggests that α > 0; by complementary
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slackness, we have w∗ = vLM .
Therefore, p∗i = vi +Nw
∗, w∗ = vLM , the problem becomes:
maxq vLqL + vH(qA + E[qH ∧X])
s.t. MvHqA = vLN(qL + E[qH ∧X])
qA + qL + qH ≤ K
(1.1)
Note that if the firm chooses q′L = q
0, q′A and q
′
H such that
Mq′A
N(q0+E[q′H∧X]) =
vL
vH
, all
conditions are satisfied, which yields a profit of pi′ = q0vL + q′AvH + E[q
′
H ∧ X] ≥
q0vL + E[qH ∧X] = pi0. Thus the optimal solution in (b) must gives a profit higher
than pi∗.
Rewrite (1) in terms of p∗ and σ∗:
maxq qLpL + E[qH ∧X]pH
s.t. MqA = σ
∗N(qL + E[qH ∧X])
qA + qL + qH ≤ K
The new Lagrangian is L = qLpL +E[qH ∧X]pH +λ(MqA−σ∗N(qL +E[qH ∧X]))−
β(qA + qL + qH −K), where β ≥ 0. Take derivatives with respect to q:
∂L
∂qA
= Mλ− β
∂L
∂qL
= pL − λσ∗N − β
∂L
∂qH
= F¯ (qH)(pH − λσ∗N)− β
If ∂L∂qA =
∂L
∂qL
= ∂L∂qH = 0, then λ =
pL
M+σ∗N , β =
MpL
M+σ∗N , qH = q = F¯
−1(
MpL
M+σ∗N
pH− σ
∗NpL
M+σ∗N
).
Plugging these back in the condition qA + qL + qH = K and MqA = σ
∗N(qL +E[qH ∧
X]), we get q∗L =
M
M+σ∗N (K − q − σ
∗N
M E[q ∧ X]), q∗A = σ
∗N
M+σ∗N (K − q + E[q ∧ X]).
However, if K − q − σ∗NM E[q ∧ X] < 0, qL is negative. Thus the condition ∂L∂qL = 0
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may not hold for the optimal solutions. In such cases, we have qL = 0, q
∗
A + q
∗
H = K,
q∗A =
σ∗N
M E[q
∗
H ∧X].
Proof of Proposition 2. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, we shall assume pi ≤ vi1−nw ,
and w ≤ vH/M .
We use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium. The proof consists of 2 steps.
1. Customers’ best responses. A type i customer’ utility from purchasing is u(I) =
vi+pinw−pi, given pi ≤ vi1−nw , we have u(I) ≥ 0. Thus the customers’ strategy space
is reduced to a ∈ {I, IA,AI}. His utility from redemption is u(A) = vi−Mw. There
are four possible customer behavior: (a) if pL ≥ Mw1−nw , then a∗L = AL, a∗H = AH/HA,
low types first redeem qA then buy qL, high types buy qH ; (b) if pL ≤ Mw1−nw and
Mw ≤ vL, then a∗L = LA, a∗H = AH/HA, low types first buy qL then redeem qA,
high types buy qH ; (c) if pL ≤ Mw1−nw ≤ pH and Mw > vL, then a∗L = L, a∗H = AH,
low types buy qL, high types first redeem qA then buy qH ; (d) if
Mw
1−nw ≥ pH , then
a∗L = L, a
∗
H = HA, low types buy qL, high types first buy qH then redeem qA.
2. Firm’s optimal strategy. The firm can use (p, q) to generate a desired w that induces
the four types of customer behavior as described above. In each case, we can derive
the closed form functions of pi, R and σ.
(a) If pL ≥ Mw1−nw , pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧X]pH , R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = pL(1−
nw), σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = MqAnpi(p,q,a∗(p,q)) .
(b) If pL ≤ Mw1−nw andMw ≤ vL, pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL+E[qH∧X]pH , R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) =
pH(1− nw), σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = MqAnpi(p,q,a∗(p,q)) .
(c) If pL ≤ Mw1−nw ≤ pH and Mw > vL, pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL+E[qH∧(X−qA)+]pH ,
R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = pH(1− nw), σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = ME[qA∧X]npi(p,q,a∗(p,q)) .
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(d) if Mw1−nw ≥ pH , pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL +E[qH ∧X]pH , R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = pH(1−
nw), σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = ME[qA∧(X−qH)
+]
npi(p,q,a∗(p,q)) .
We next show that (b) dominates (a), (c) and (d). First, we prove that in case (a),
(c) and (d), the optimal profit is smaller than the case without LP (pi0). Note that
Mw = Rσ, where σ = MsAnpi . This gives nwpi = RsA. Plug this in the profit function
we have
pi =
∑
i=L,H pisi
≤∑i=L,H vi1−nwsi
=
∑
i=L,H visi + nwpisi
=
∑
i=L,H visi + nwpi
=
∑
i=L,H visi +RsA
For case (a), R = pL(1−nw) ≤ vL, so pi ≤ maxqA,qL,qH vL(qA+qL)+vHE[qH∧X] = pi0.
For case (c) and (d), R = pH(1−nw) ≤ vH . Thus, pi ≤ maxqA,qL,qH vLqL+vHE[(qH +
qA) ∧X] = pi0.
Second, we prove that (b) gives a higher profit than pi0. We plug the corresponding
a∗, pi, σ and R into (1):
maxp,q pi(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧X]pH
s.t. Mw = pH(1− nw) MqAn(qLpL+E[qH∧X]pH)
pi ≤ vi1−nw
pL ≤ Mw1−nw
Mw ≤ vL
qA + qL + qH ≤ K
Similarly, we can think of w as a new decision variable that is subject to those con-
straints. We shall show that the optimal solutions have p∗i =
vi
1−nw∗ , w
∗ = vLM .
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Using Kuhn-Tucker method similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we have w∗ = vLM ,
p∗i =
vi
1−nw∗ .
Therefore, the problem becomes:
maxq vLqL + vH(qA + E[qH ∧X])
s.t. MvHqA = vLn(vLqL + vH(qA + E[qH ∧X]))
qA + qL + qH ≤ K
(1.2)
Note that if the firm chooses q′L = q
0, q′A and q
′
H such that
Mq′A
n(vLqL+vH(qA+E[qH∧X])) =
vL
vH
, all conditions are satisfied, which yields a profit of pi′ = q0vL+q′AvH+E[q
′
H∧X] ≥
q0vL + E[qH ∧X] = pi0. Thus the optimal solution in (b) must gives a profit higher
than pi∗.
Rewrite (2) in terms of p∗ and σ∗:
maxpH ,qj qLpL + E[qH ∧X]pH
s.t. MqA = σ
∗n(qLpL + E[qH ∧X]pH)
qA + qL + qH ≤ K
The new Lagrangian function is L = qLpL + E[qH ∧ X]pH + λ(MqA − σ∗n(qLpL +
E[qH ∧X]pH))− β(qA + qL + qH −K), where β ≥ 0. Take derivatives with respect to
q we have
∂L
∂qA
= λM − β
∂L
∂qL
= pL(1− λσ∗n)− β
∂L
∂qH
= F¯ (qH)pH(1− λσ∗n)− β
If ∂L∂qA =
∂L
∂qL
= ∂L∂qH = 0, then λ =
σ∗npL
M+σ∗npL , β =
Mσ∗npL
M+σ∗npL , qH = q¯ = F¯
−1( vLvH ).
Plugging these back in the constraints qA + qL + qH = K and MqA = σ
∗n(qLpL +
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E[qH ∧X]pH), we get q∗L = MM+σ∗np∗L (K− q¯−
σ∗np∗H
M E[q¯∧X]), q∗A = σ
∗n
M+σ∗np∗L
(p∗L(K−
q¯) + p∗HE[q¯ ∧ X]). However, if K − q¯ − σ
∗np∗H
M E[q¯ ∧ X] < 0, qL is negative. In such
cases, we have q∗L = 0, q
∗
A and q
∗
H satisfies q
∗
A + q
∗
H = K, q
∗
A =
σ∗np∗H
M E[q
∗
H ∧X].
Proof of Proposition 3. Similarly to the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2, we shall assume
pi ≤ vi1−nw , and w ≤ 1m+n .
We use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium. The proof consists of 2 steps.
1. Customers’ best responses. A type i customer’ utility from purchasing is u(I) =
vi + pinw − pi, given pi ≤ vi1−nw , we have u(I) ≥ 0. Thus the customers’ strategy
space is reduced to a ∈ {I, IA,AI}. His utility from redemption is u(A) = vi−mpiw.
Since (m + n)w ≤ 1, we have two possible customer behavior: (a) if (m + n)w ≤ 1,
then u(A) ≥ u(I) for I = L,H, a∗L = AL, a∗H = AH, low types first redeem qA then
buy qL, high types buy qH . (b) if (m + n)w = 1, then u(I) < u(A) for I = L,H
and pi = pL, pH , a
∗
L = L, a
∗
H = HA, low types first buy qL, high types buy qH then
redeem qA; (b)
2. Firm’s optimal strategy. Rewrite the firm’s profit as
pi =
∑
i=L,H pisi
≤∑i=L,H vi1−nwsi
=
∑
i=L,H visi + nwpisi
=
∑
i=L,H visi + nwpi
=
∑
i=L,H visi +RsA
The firm can use (p, q) to generate a desired w that induces the two types of customer
behavior as described above. In each case, we can derive the closed form functions of
pi, R and σ.
47
(a) If (m + n)w ≤ 1, a∗L = AL, a∗H = AH, pi(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧X]pH .
There are two cases. If qL > 0, R(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = pL(1− nw), σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) =
mpLqA
npi(p,q,a∗(p,q)) . We have
pi ≤∑i=L,H visi +RsA
=
∑
i=L,H visi + pL(1− nw)sA
≤∑i=L,H vL(qA + qL) + vHE[qH ∧X]
≤ pi0
The Littlewood profit is attainable at pi =
vi
1−nw , qH = q
0
H , qA + qL = q
0
L and
q∗A ∈ [0, nm(qL + vHvLE[q0H ∧X])] (so the redemption rate σ ≤ 1).
If qL = 0, R(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = pH(1 − nw), σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = mpHqAnpi(p,q,a∗(p,q)) . The
optimal profit in this case is
maxp,q pi(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = E[qH ∧X]pH
s.t. Mw = pH(1− nw) pHmqAnE[qH∧X]pH
pH ≤ vH1−nw
(m+ n)w ≤ 1
qA + qH ≤ K
By solving this program, we have pH =
vH
1−nw , qA =
vLn
vHm
E[qH∧X], w = vLvLn+vHm .
The profit is pia = vH(qA + E[qH ∧X]).
(b) If (m + n)w = 1, a∗L = L, a
∗
H = HA, pi(p, q, a
∗(p, q)) = qLpL + E[qH ∧ X]pH ,
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R(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = pH(1− nw), σ(p, q, a∗(p, q)) = mpHE[(X−qH)
+∧qA]
npi(p,q,a∗(p,q)) . We have
pi ≤∑i=L,H visi +RsA
=
∑
i=L,H visi + pH(1− nw)sA
≤∑i=L,H vLqL + vHE[(qH + qA) ∧X]
≤ pi0
The Littlewood profit is attainable at pi =
vi
1−nw , qL = q
0
L, qA + qH = q
0
H and
E[(X − qH)+ ∧ qA] ∈ [0, nm( vLvH q0L + E[qH ∧X])] (so the redemption rate σ ≤ 1).
As a final step, we need to compare pia from closing the low price capacity and and
pi0 from the Littlewood benchmark. Note that when K is small, q0L = 0, pi
0 =
vHE[K ∧X] ≤ vH((K− qH) +E[qH ∧X]) = pia. It suffices to show that when q0L > 0,
there exists K¯, such that pia ≥ pi0 iff K ≤ K¯. Note that when q0L ≥ 0, ∂pi
0
∂K = vL,
∂2pi0
∂K2
= 0. In contrast, ∂pi
a
∂K = vH
1+
nvL
mvH
1
F¯ (qH )
+
nvL
mvH
, ∂
2pia
∂K2
= ∂pi
a
∂F¯ (qH)
∂F¯ (qH)
∂qH
∂qH
∂K ≤ 0. Therefore,
∂2pi0−pia
∂K2
< 0, and pi0−pia when qL = 0, so there exists K¯ such that pia ≥ pi0 iff K ≤ K¯.
∂pia
∂K = vH ,
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CHAPTER 2 : LOYALTY PROGRAMS AND CONSUMER CHOICE:
EVIDENCE FROM AIRLINE INDUSTRY
We study customers’ valuation of loyalty program points. By using airlines survey data,
we compute customers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for points at issuance and willingness
to accept (WTA) at redemption. We demonstrate that compared to the objective value
of miles, customers over-evaluate miles both at issuance (by 139%) and redemption (by
346%). The huge difference may result from overconfidence of the redemption value and
redemption probability. We also show that airlines can improve profits (up to 7%) by simply
manipulating program designs.
2.1. Introduction
Loyalty programs have been ubiquitous in modern industries. A frequent-flyer program
(FFP) is a loyalty program offered by an airline. Such programs are designed to encourage
airline customers to accumulate “miles” which may then be redeemed for air travel or other
rewards.
The miles earned and redeemed under FFPs may be price-dependent or independent. The
most traditional program type is mileage-based programs, in which both the issuance and
redemption are price-independent: while the number of the issued miles equal to the flying
distance of the customer, the number of redeemed miles is fixed for domestic flight. For
example, consider a customer who flies from Philadelphia to San Francisco. Under a mileage-
based program, he earns 2,515 miles (the distance) no matter how much he pays; when he
wishes to redeem a domestic flight, he spends 25,000 miles. Contrary to mileage-based
programs, fare-based programs determine both the number of issued miles and the number
of redeemed miles proportional to the price the customer pays. In the previous example,
suppose the airline changes to a fare-based program which issues 5 miles for every dollar
the customer pays and requires 60 miles for every dollar he redeem. If the price is $500,
then the customer earns 25,00 miles for a cash-paid ticket, and redeems 300,000 miles for
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an award ticket; if the price is $300, then the numbers reduce to 1,500 miles and 180,000
miles respectively. Finally, a third type of program is mixed-program, in which the issuance
is proportional to the price (like in a fare-based program) and the redemption is fixed (like
in a mileage-based program).
Ever since American Airlines launched its AAdvantage mileage program in 1981, almost
every airlines started with a mileage-based program. However, the industry has witnessed
a recent trend of changing toward price-dependent issuance and redemption. For example,
JetBlue (True Blue) and Southwest Airlines (Rapid Rewards) changed to fare-based pro-
grams around 2010. United Airlines and Delta Airlines offered their new mixed programs
in 2014; American Airlines followed in 2016.
These program changes imposed an impact on the value of frequent flyer miles, which have
emerged as a virtual currency. Typically, customers earn miles for their purchases and sub-
sequently redeem them for rewards. It has been shown that frequent flyer program members
are willing to spend 2% to 12% more for similar itineraries provided by the program carrier
than by other airlines (Brunger, 2013). In fact, casual assessments tend to put the value of
most loyalty points at between $0.01 and $0.02 each; for example, an AAdvantage mile is
estimated to be worth $0.017 (BoardingArea, 2014). Despite the heating discussions about
the value of frequent flyer miles in different programs, it remains unclear how customers
evaluate miles at their purchasing and redemption decisions.
Our research aims to investigate how customers evaluate this virtual currency given different
program designs and rewarding rules. Specifically, we look at three levels of the values:
Market value of miles Since miles can be used to redeem for flight ticket, their market
value can be calculated based on the market price of the awarded ticket. For instance,
suppose for airline i, the every price of a ticket redeemed by 25,000 miles is $500, then the
market value of a mile is $0.02. This reflects the objective value of miles (OBJ).
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Value of miles at issuance When customers accumulate miles by paying cash, they
may be willing to pay additionally for more issued miles. We are interested in the amount
of cash price the customers are willing to pay for the issued miles. This reflects customers’
subjective willingness to pay (WTP) as buyers of miles.
Value of miles at redemption When customers spend miles to redeem award, they
compare the mile price to the cash price. We are interested in the customers’ disutility of
spending miles as opposed to spending cash. This reflects customers’ subjective willingness
to accept (WTA) as sellers of miles.
The goal is to calculate each level of the values, and study how they influence customers’
choice decisions at both the purchasing point and redemption point. While many frequent
flyers calculated that each mile is worth 1-2 cents based on the value of a redeemable
award, the question remains unclear whether customers make decisions according to this
value. We shall calibrate both the objective and the subjective values of miles from real
customer transaction data. Moreover, we will address the following questions.
• How do the WTP and WTA of miles compare to the objective market values (OBJ)?
• Do operational decisions (award availability, award choices and award rules) impact
how customers evaluate miles and consequently their decision-making processes?
• Do miles carry different values in different airlines and at different locations? What
is the impact of program changes on the values?
Finally, given the value of miles, we are also interested in its interpretations on the airlines’
profits. Specifically, the number of issued miles varies across program designs and may
result in different impacts on revenues. Which program design is most profitable? Do
airlines benefit from changing to fare-based issuance of frequent flyer miles? We shall
address these questions in the study.
Our work is related to the literature on consumer behavior in the context of loyalty pro-
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grams. Many papers have studied how consumers perceive and value loyalty points as an
independent currency. Using a reference dependence framework, Dre`ze and Nunes (2004)
developed a mental accounting model where customers evaluate different currencies (i.e.,
cash and loyalty points) in separate accounts; Stourm et al. (2015) recently extended
this mental accounting model to explain why many customers stockpile loyalty points even
though the firm does not reward such behavior. In another study, van Osselaer et al. (2004)
showed that loyalty points are an overvalued currency and create an illusion of progress.
In a similar vein, Kivetz et al. (2006) and Nunes and Dre`ze (2006) showed that artificial
advancement (e.g., replacing a 10-stamp coffee card with a 12-stamp card that starts with
2 stamps already filled in) increases customer effort; the former study also found evidence
of purchase acceleration as customers come closer to earning rewards. These results suggest
that customers place an explicit value on each loyalty point even though loyalty points are
only a medium (i.e., a means to an end); see Hsee et al. (2003) on the medium effect. Fi-
nally, Raghubir and Srivastava (2002) and Wertenbroch et al. (2007) found that consumers’
valuation of an unfamiliar currency (such as loyalty points) is biased towards the face value;
a possible explanation is that consumers anchor on the nominal face value and do not adjust
sufficiently for the exchange rate when making decisions. Sayman and Hoch (2014) showed
that buyers are willing to pay a price premium for loyalty points, and the premium is less
than the normative levels. Motivated by these behavioral studies, our theoretical model
takes the view that each loyalty point is a unit of currency valued at the nominal face value
of goods that it can be redeemed for.
2.2. Data
The primary database we used is Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) conducted
by Bureau of Transportation Statistics. It is a 10% sample of airline tickets from report-
ing carriers. Data includes origin, destination and other itinerary details of passengers
transported.
To compare the effect of program change in early 2015, we used data in 2014 and 2015. Each
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quarter has more than 1 million itineraries over around 10 thousand routes operated by 27
carriers. We restricted our analysis to round-trip itineraries with an origin at large/medium
hubs (with a ranking smaller or equal to 61 in Passenger Boarding (Enplanement) and All-
Cargo Data for U.S. Airports). This accounts for 87.7% of total data.
Table 4-4 summarize the statistics of major airlines in the dataset in both years. Between
the year of 2014 and 2015, the industry witnessed an overall price drop and demand in-
crease, with two exceptions. United Airlines increased its price at the cost of demand loss.
Southwest decreased its price but still had demand loss. Note that these numbers were
calculated by aggregating all itineraries and routes.
Besides DB1B database, two other databases were used. First, the census population data
for the origin cities was utilized to calculate the total market base. Second, the airline on-
time performance data was used to get information about the take-off time of each flight,
as well as the delay frequency and duration.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (2014)
Airlines American Alaska United Delta Southwest JetBlue Frontier
Routes 2607 169 1081 2267 4082 240 426
Total Passengers 1663509 315565 1025765 1488061 3061011 515823 260145
Average Passengers 164.5 539.4 246.3 177.5 173.8 538.7 199.0
lightgrayAverage Price 225.0 178.8 252.4 238.6 179.3 192.0 137.1
yellow Average Distance 1156.8 1112.6 1363.8 1106.5 880.6 1241.0 1014.5
greenAverage Miles Awarded 1156.8 1112.6 1363.8 1106.5 1075.8 1152.0 1014.5
Origin Flight Share 14.8% 15.8% 17.8% 17.3% 40.2% 19.5% 3.5%
Award Fraction 6.3% 5.7% 9.2% 8.7% 11.5% 3.9% 2.9%
Table 4: Summary of Statistics (2015)
Airlines American Alaska United Delta Southwest JetBlue Frontier
Routes 2636 140 1214 2230 4763 267 401
Total Passengers 1673525 349751 1071056 1529566 2675637 553929 338724
Average Passengers 175.1 672.6 245.3 180.1 170.1 553.6 281.1
lightgrayAverage Price 209.2 180.5 241.9 232.7 175.8 190.1 106.6
yellowAverage Distance 1163.1 1120.7 1349.6 1108.0 908.3 1249.9 1072.5
greenAverage Miles Awarded 1163.1 1120.7 1209.5 1163.5 1054.8 1140.6 1072.5
Origin Flight Share 14.1% 15.4% 33.8% 21.8% 30.3% 19.4% 2.7%
Award Fraction 5.4% 5.4% 8.9% 8.2% 12.0% 6.9% 1.5%
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2.3. Methods
To analyze the problem, we aggregate itineraries over each flight route and calculate route-
specific attributes (average price, standard deviation of prices, number of passengers, num-
ber of stops, mileage distance, etc.), resulting in over 10 thousand observations every quar-
ter. (The standard deviation of prices is to capture price fluctuation in each route due to
revenue management.)
2.3.1. Market Value of a Mile
The market value of a mile can be calculated by dividing the average market price of the
redeemed awards by the number of miles needed for an award. For example, American Air-
lines requires 25,000 miles for a round-trip award ticket from Philadelphia to San Francisco.
The average price of a direct flight ticket is $334.96, resulting in an average value of 1.34
cent per mile; in contrast, the average price of a two-stop flight ticket is $298.75, resulting
in a value of each mile to be 1.19 cent. Using the similar method and aggregation, we can
calibrate the value of a mile redeemed for every route, every airline and every year.
2.3.2. Value of an Issued Mile
In this subsection, we calculate the value of issued miles to customers. Consider customer
i who plans to travel from Philadelphia to San Francisco (route j), he face the following
options: i) 8am nonstop flight for $800 by American Airlines, which issues 2,515 miles;
ii) 2pm one-stop flight for $500 by Southwest Airlines, which issues 3,000 miles; iii) 11pm
one-stop flight for $300 by Delta Airlines, which issues 1,500 miles. The customer’s final
decisions should take all information into account, i.e. flight time, fare price, and the number
of issued miles. We shall analyze how each factor influences the customers’ choice decisions.
For every route j offered by carrier c, its flight time is captured by a vector takeofftimejc =
[takeofftimetjc], where takeofftime
t
jc is the number of flights during time tth hour of
the day, t = 1, · · · , 24. The prices are captured in variables pricejc and pricesdjc, which
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measure the mean and stand deviation of prices respectively. The number of issued miles
is captured by milesearnedjc. Here, for mileage-based programs, we have milesearnedjc =
distancej , where distancej is the flying distance of route j; for fare-based programs, we
have milesearnedjc = issueratec · pricejc, where issueratec = 6 for Southwest Airlines,
issueratec = 5 for United Airlines and Delta Airlines. (We didn’t consider JetBlue here
because the issuing policy varies by purchasing channels.)
Note that the effect of the issuing miles may be dependent on the future values of the miles,
which further relies on their easiness of redemption. Without loss of generosity, we use
two factors to capture the easiness of redemption: redemption rate and redemption choices.
Hence, we shall include the interaction of these factors into the regression function as well.
The award redemption rate can be estimated using origin-carrier (OC) pairs. Specifically, we
use fracawardoc as a proxy for reward redemption rate, where fracawardoc is the fraction
of reward passengers over all passengers for all the routes from an origin o by carrier c.
For example, at Philadelphia International Airport, American Airlines rewards 5.96% of its
tickets, so we have fracawardoc = 0.0596. Note that this metric is the joint result of both
award supply and award demand. Nevertheless, for most Airlines except Southwest, the
award availability is below 90% (IdeaWorks Survy); hence, fracawardoc is more of a valid
metric for award supply than demand. Even in the case of Southwest, when fracawardoc
purely reflects award demand, it should still be positively correlated with award redemption
rate.
Similarly, we use OC pairs to calibrate redemption choices. One hypothesis is the following:
if a higher fraction of future flights at the customers’ home airport o is carried by airline
c, the customer has more opportunities to use the miles issued by c. Hence, the expected
future value of miles becomes higher, and the customer is more likely to be influenced by the
issuance of miles. To capture this effect, we use flightshareoc as a proxy for the proportion
of future flights carried by c, where flightshareoc equals to the fraction of flight routes
offered by c over all the flight routes from origin o.
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We use Logit model to estimate the impact of these metrics. Specifically, and the market
share of route j from origin o to destination d by carrier c is given by
sjcod =
exp{ujcod}∑
j′,c′ exp{uj′c′od}
(2.1)
where ujcod is the customer’s expected utility:
ujcod = β0 + β1 · pricej + β2 · pricesdj + β3 · distancej + β4 · stops
+β5 ·milesearnedjc + β6 · fracawardoc + β7 · flightshareoc
+β8 ·milesearnedjc · fracawardoc + β9 ·milesearnedjc · flightshareoc
(2.2)
we also control for time, ticket carrier, flight quality (takeoff time, origin airport and desti-
nation airport), and program type in the regression.
Here, we are interested to see whether the coefficients from β5 to β10 are significant. Besides,
we can calculate the value of an issued mile to customers to be wI(γ) = β5+β8fracawardoc+β9flightshareocβ1
.
However, note that the estimate of β1 and β2 may suffer from endogeneity issues. Specif-
ically, if airline c forecasts the demand to decrease for route j, it may drop its prices to
attract more travelers. As a result, the loss of passengers (or decrease in consumer demand)
may seem to be a result of the price drop. Hence, β1 is biased downward and consequently
the value of miles are biased upward. It is also likely that that as demand increases, the po-
tential revenue becomes more attractive and competition becomes more severe, the airlines
drop prices to promote their own routes and β1 is biased upward. Similarly, the airlines may
apply different dynamic pricing strategies when expected demand varies, thus resulting in
a biased estimate of β2. To control for this endogeneity, we create a set of instrument vari-
ables, including the mean and standard deviation of the prices the airline charges at other
origin airports, which is referred to as Hausman-type price instruments (Hausman, 1996).
For example, consider a route from Philadelphia to San Francisco by American Airlines, we
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use the pricing information of all AA flights going to San Francisco from places other than
Philadelphia as instruments. It captures the characteristics of the airlines’ general pricing
schemes, but does not include any other information from the route “market” (since the
“market” is based on the origin - Philadelphia). We run a two step least squares regressions.
2.3.3. Value of a Redeemed Mile
In this subsection, we calculate the value of a redeemed mile. Consider a customer who has
accumulated enough miles to redeem for a free flight ticket with carrier c. At each travel
opportunity, he chooses between redeeming his miles and paying cash to save the miles for
future use. For example, suppose he flies from Philadelphia and San Francisco. The current
cash price is $500, while the required miles for a redemption is 25,000. He compares the
two options.
Using Logit model, the fraction of customers who pay cash for route j is given by
cj =
exp{ucj}
exp{ucj}+ exp{umj }
(2.3)
the rest is the proportion of customers who pay miles:
mj =
exp{umj }
exp{ucj}+ exp{umj }
(2.4)
Here, ucj and u
m
j are the customers’ expected utility from using cash ($500) and miles (25,000
miles) for route j, respectively. Apparently, if the price in cash is high, the customers’
utility from paying cash (ucj) is lower, if the price in miles or the value of miles is high,
then the customers’ utility from using the miles (umj ) is low. The value of miles depends
on the chances of a future redemption using those miles, which might be dependent of the
redemption rate (fracredeemedoc) and redemption choices (flightshareoc).
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Thus, we can model these effects in a simple regression
log
mj
1−mj = u
m
j − ucj = γ0 + γ1 · pricej + γ2 · pricesdj + γ3 · distancej + γ4 · stops
+γ5 ·milesredeemedjc + γ6 · fracawardoc + γ7 · flightshareoc
+γ8 ·milesredeemedjc · fracawardoc + γ9 ·milesredeemedjc · flightshareoc
(2.5)
We are interested to estimate γ1, γ5, γ8 and γ9 and test whether they are significantly
different from 0. Intuitively, γ1 ≥ 0 (higher cash prices, more redemption), γ5 ≤ 0 (higher
mile prices, fewer redemption), γ8 ≤ 0 and γ9 ≤ 0 (easier redemptions, higher value of
miles). Moreover, the value of one mile should be equal to |γ7+γ8·fracawardoc+γ9·flightshareoc|γ1 .
However, note that the effect of fracawardoc does not only impact the customers’ future
redemptions, but also reflect the convenience of the current redemption as well. Specifically,
if fracawardoc is high, the award capacity of the route is likely to be higher and the customer
find it easier to redeem his miles. This results in a higher mj and a positive γ8, which biases
the value of miles downward. Hence, the effect of future award availability on the value
of miles cannot be accurately predicted by fracaward, so we exclude it from regression.
Besides, the value of a redeemed mile may also be route-dependent, i.e., for those routes
with higher values, the redeemed miles carry higher values. To capture this effect, we use a
variable destpriced, which equals to the average price of all routes to the same destination
from other origins. This variables is a proxy for the value of the route, without using any
market price information of the origin airport. Hence, the regression equation is updated
below.
log
mj
1−mj = u
m
j − ucj = γ0 + γ1 · pricej + γ2 · pricesdj + γ3 · distancej + γ4 · stops
+γ5 ·milesredeemedjc + γ6 · destpriced + γ7 · flightshareoc
+γ8 ·milesredeemedjc · destpriced+
γ9 ·milesredeemedjc · flightshareoc + γ10 ·milesredeemedjc · fracawardoc
(2.6)
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Similarly, the estimate of γ1 may suffer from endogeneity issues. Specifically, if the route is
more “touristic” (i.e., it has more leisure customers who wish to redeem miles), the firm may
adjust prices as follows. First, the firm anticipates more redemptions, hence fewer capacity
sold for cash. It increases cash prices to sell to a smaller group of high-end cash-paying
customers. This inflates the estimate γ1. Second, the firm anticipates higher demand for
redemptions. To maintain the volume of cash sales, it decreases cash prices to induce more
cash purchases. This deflates the estimate of γ1.
Both endogeneity problems come from the unobserved demand for the route. We control
this by including origin and destination in the regression equation. Besides, we also use the
same set of instrument variables for the mean and standard deviation of prices.
Finally, note that we model the issuance and redemption separately. In the previous sec-
tion, customers can purchase with cash from all airlines, but can not redeem miles. The
simplification can be justified by two assumptions: (i) the customers are business travelers
who only spend cash for the trip; (ii) the customers haven’t accumulated enough miles for
an award redemption. In contrast, this section allows customers to redeem miles, but does
not consider the customers’ outside option of using cash for other airlines. This assumption
can be justified by the following reasons. First, since the customer has accumulated enough
miles for a redemption, he must be a “frequent flyer” with carrier c. It is very likely that
c is his preferred carrier. Research has shown that customers are willing to pay up to 12%
more for similar itineraries provided by their major program carrier than by other airlines
(Brunger, 2013). The customer may prefer to spending more with carrier c rather than
switching to other carriers. Second, for all the origin airports we have, the dominant carri-
ers offer around 49.29% of all flights, while the second popular carrier only carries 17.15% of
all flights. Hence, competition is not very intense and we can assume that customers stick
with one carrier once they accumulate enough miles. By these assumptions, we restrict the
customers’ choices to the simple binary decisions.
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2.4. Results: Value of Miles
2.4.1. Market Value of Miles (Objective Value)
The average price of a redeemed ticket is $207.52, resulting in a value of one mile around
0.83 cent. This value is well below the 1.4 cent per mile benchmark calculated by Tripadvi-
sor.com. Decomposing the redemptions into each airlines and both years yields the following
table. (The values of Southwest and JetBlue miles are calculated by using program rules. )
Table 5: Market Value of a Mile (Unit: Cent)
Airlines American Alaska United Delta Southwest JetBlue
2014 0.98 0.77 1.07 1.04 1.67 1.40
2015 0.80 0.81 1.05 0.98 1.49 1.40
The most valuable miles are from Southwest Airlines. Their program allowed 60 miles to
account for one dollar at redemption, yielding one mile to be worth of 1.67 cent. In 2015,
Southwest devalued its miles by increasing the exchange rate to 70:1 from April. This
resulted in an average value of 1.49 cent per mile throughout the year. The least valuable
miles are from Alaska Airlines, due to low prices of the redeemed tickets ($192.14 in 2014
and $201.40 in 2015).
Moreover, we can also calculate the value of miles for every route. The most valuable
redemption is flying directly from New York (EWR) to Dallas (DFW) by American Airlines,
yielding a value of 2.25 cent per mile. The least valuable redemption is flying directly from
Las Vegas (LAX) to Salt Lake City (SLC), yielding a value of 0.64 cent per mile.
2.4.2. Value of an Issued Mile (WTP)
We first run model (2.1) - (2.2) and summarize the results in Table 6.
The key observations are as follows:
62
1. Higher prices lead to lower customer utility. More revenue management (higher stan-
dard deviation of prices) leads to a higher chance of finding a bargain and hence higher
customer utility.
2. Miles are worthless when award space and award choices are non-existent (fracaward
and flightshare are standardized). Miles become a scam and may generate negative
utility to customers. Only when there is any redemption options do customers value
miles.
3. The average value of an issued mile is 3.64 cent.
4. Award availability (fracaward) has a negative impact on customer utility (perhaps
due to the reduced availability for cash purchases), but a positive impact on the value
of frequent flyer miles (customers enjoy the easiness of redemption).
5. Award choices (flightshare) has a positive impact on customer utility (since cus-
tomers are likely to be members of dominant programs), but do not have any impact
on the value of frequent flyer miles.
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Table 6: Consumer Choice Model (Issued Miles)
Dependent Variable: Consumer Utility
OLS Regression 2SLS Regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
price −0.0239∗∗∗−0.0265∗∗∗−0.0429∗∗∗−0.0197∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0043) (0.0040)
pricesd 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0357∗∗∗ 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.0722∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0060) (0.0059)
stops −21.3500∗∗∗−21.0000∗∗∗−21.1100∗∗∗−20.5200∗∗∗
(0.1254) (0.1285) (0.1627) (0.1637)
distance −0.0023∗∗∗−0.0027∗∗∗−0.0018∗∗∗−0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
milesearned 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
fracaward −3.2750 −35.6800∗∗∗
(3.1800) (3.9670)
flightshare 12.2500∗∗∗ −0.2018
(0.6260) (2.2230)
milesearned · fracaward 0.0007 0.0215∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0055)
milesearned · flightshare −0.0003 −0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0007)
ticketcarrier X X X X
origin X X X X
destination X X X X
year X X X X
quarter X X X X
ontimes X X X X
takeofftime X X X X
farebased X X X X
R2 0.7370 0.7405 0.7355 0.7305
Adj. R2 0.7365 0.7400 0.7351 0.7300
6. The value of miles in cash can be predicted below with and without IV (we exclude
JetBlue because the issuance rules depend on the purchasing channel):
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Figure 5: Value of Issued Miles
Table 7: Value of an Issued Mile without IV (Unit: Cent)
(Market Value in Parenthesis)
Airlines American Alaska United Delta Southwest
2014 1.68 (0.98) 1.65 (0.77) 1.72 (1.07) 1.72 (1.04) 1.51 (1.67)
2015 1.68 (0.80) 1.67 (0.81) 1.52 (1.05) 1.65 (0.98) 1.64 (1.49)
Table 8: Value of an Issued Mile with IV (Unit: Cent)
(Market Value in Parenthesis)
Airlines American Alaska United Delta Southwest
2014 1.95 (0.98) 0.47 (0.77) 3.76 (1.07) 3.69 (1.04) 5.94 (1.67)
2015 1.00 (0.80) 0.80 (0.81) 3.28 (1.05) 2.99 (0.98) 6.69 (1.49)
Key observations from Table 8:
(a) Southwest miles have the highest value (5.94-6.69cent), almost four times of the
1.4cent benchmark.
(b) Alaska miles have the lowest value (0.47 cent) in 2014, but its value improved in
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2015 due to enhanced award capacity (a 6.4% improvement from 4.67% award
capacity in 2014 to to 4.97% award capacity in 2015).
(c) The most valuable miles are Southwest Airlines at ABQ (12.22 cent per mile),
followed by Delta Airline miles at CVG (8.27cent per mile). (CVG is a hub
airport of Delta Airlines).
(d) The least valuable miles are Alaska Airline miles at BDL, with 0% award capacity.
2.4.3. Value of a Redeemed Mile (WTA)
We first run the models and summarize the results in Table 9.
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Table 9: Consumer Choice Model (Redeemed Miles)
Dependent Variable: uc − um
OLS Regression 2SLS Regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
price 0.1956∗∗∗ 0.3055∗∗∗ 0.3158∗∗∗ 0.2498∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0200) (0.0131)
pricesd 0.1238∗∗∗ 0.0896∗∗∗ 0.3549∗∗∗ 0.4330∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0265) (0.0260)
stops 16.9500∗∗∗22.4900∗∗∗ 23.3800∗∗∗ 25.7400∗∗∗
(1.0200) (1.0430) (1.0890) (1.0820)
distance 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗−0.0040∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0013)
milesredeemed −0.0052∗∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0004)
flightshare 18.3400∗∗∗ −49.0500∗∗
(5.5540) (16.7400)
destprice 164.0000∗∗∗ 294.5000∗∗∗
(47.2900) (62.4600)
milesredeemed · flightshare −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004)
milesredeemed · destprice −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006)
ticketcarrier X X X X
origin X X X X
destination X X X X
year X X X X
quarter X X X X
ontimes X X X X
takeofftime X X X X
farebased X X X X
R2 0.3371 0.3526 0.3182 0.3376
Adj. R2 0.3357 0.3511 0.3168 0.3361
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Figure 6: Value of Redeemed Miles
Key observations from the table:
1. Higher cash prices lead to more award redemptions; higher mile prices lead to fewer
award redemptions.
2. The value of redeemed miles (WTA) is significantly positive even when there is no
chance of using the miles in the future, i.e. flightshare = 0.
3. Higher chance of using miles in the future (flightshare) leads to higher value of
redeemed miles. Higher values of the route destination (destprice) leads to higher
value of redeemed miles.
4. The average value of a redeemed mile is 2.35 cent. The value of miles in cash can
be predicted in the Table 10-11 (we does not include JetBlue because the redemption
rules vary on flight-to-flight basis):
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Table 10: Value of a Redeemed Mile without IV (Unit: Cent)
(Market Value in Parenthesis)
Airlines American Alaska United Delta Southwest
2014 1.71 (0.98) 1.70 (0.77) 1.73 (1.07) 1.72 (1.04) 1.79 (1.67)
2015 1.71 (0.80) 1.69 (0.81) 1.79 (1.05) 1.74 (0.98) 1.75 (1.49)
Table 11: Value of a Redeemed Mile with IV (Unit: Cent)
(Market Value in Parenthesis)
Airlines American Alaska United Delta Southwest
2014 2.29 (0.98) 2.29 (0.77) 2.33 (1.07) 2.32 (1.04) 2.49 (1.67)
2015 2.28 (0.80) 2.27 (0.81) 2.47 (1.05) 2.36 (0.98) 2.40 (1.49)
Key observations from Table 11:
(a) Southwest miles have the highest value (2.49 cent) in 2014. While it is still higher
than the 1.4 cent benchmark, it is much lower than the WTP (over 5 cent).
(b) United miles have the highest value (2.47 cent) in 2015, due to improved flight
share by over 15%.
(c) The most valuable redemption is by flying with American Airlines from Charlotte
(CLT) to Cincinnati (CVG) (3.25 cent per mile). However, if that American
Airlines mile is used to fly Baltimore (BWI) to Oakland (OAK), it only yields
1.89 cent in value.
(d) Another example is Alaska Airlines. Using one mile from Salt Lake City to San
Jose gives a value 2.02 cent, while from Seattle to New York gives 2.75 cent per
mile.
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2.4.4. Comparisons between WTP, WTA and Objective Values
In the previous subsections, we calculated both the objective market values (OBJ) and the
subjective values of miles at issuance (WTP) and redemption (WTA). The tables suggest
that WTP≥ and WTA≥ OBJ. We will further calculate these values for every route (given
origin, destination and stops) and compare them using paired one-tail t-tests.
• H1: WTA>OBJ.
– Without IV: The t-test is significant (t = 386.8825, df = 72386, p − value <
2.2e− 16) and gives a mean difference of 0.53 cent at 95% confidence interval.
– With IV: The t-test is significant (t = 825.6316, df = 72386, p−value < 2.2e−16)
and gives a mean difference of 1.16 cent at 95% confidence interval.
• H2: WTP>OBJ.
– Without IV: The t-test is significant (t = 222.3091, df = 72386, p − value <
2.2e− 16) and gives a mean difference of 0.42 cent at 95% confidence interval.
– With IV: The t-test is significant (t = 236.8925, df = 72386, p−value < 2.2e−16)
and gives a mean difference of 2.87 cent at 95% confidence interval.
Those t-tests support our hypotheses. Customers over-evaluate miles at issuance and under-
spend miles at redemption, compared to the objective value of miles.
2.5. Counterfactual Analysis
Recently, several airlines changed from mileage-based issuance of miles to fare-based is-
suance of miles. For instance, Southwest Airlines changed to fare-based program in 2011;
Delta switched to mixed-program in 2015, United followed in the same year and Ameri-
can in the next year. In this section, we shall address the profitability of such program
modifications.
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For those airlines, a major change is the number of miles issued to customers. Those miles
carry value. Therefore, if the airline issues more miles, then it can potentially charge a
higher price and keep the same level of customer utility (hence the same level of market
share as suggested by the Logit model). In contrast, if the airline issues fewer miles in
the new program, it needs to decrease its price to make up for it. For instance, table 8
indicates that a United Airlines mile is worth 3.28 cent in 2015. If United issues 100 fewer
mile to customers on average under the new program, it must decrease its price by $3.28
so customers would still purchase the same amount of tickets. Since the average fare of an
United ticket is $266, the price drop would result in a decrease of 1.23% of its total profit.
The analysis can be decomposed into every route as follows. For every route, we first
calculate the miles earned under the hypothetical program (for example, United has fare-
based issuance in 2015, then the hypothetical program is fare-independent issuance, i.e., its
old program in 2014, which issues one mile for every mile flown). Then, given the change
in the issued miles, we calibrate the price that maintains the same level of market share (or
same level of customer utility) in the hypothetical program. This could be done by utilizing
the regression results in Table 6. Finally, we aggregate the revenue changes of all routes, to
determine whether the hypothetical program is more profitable for this airline.
For example, United Airlines changed to mixed-program in 2015 and issued 1758.8 miles on
average for a round trip ticket from PHL to SFO. In contrast, if it kept its mileage-based
program, it would have issued 2645.8 miles on average for the same route - 887 more miles.
Since each mile is valued at 3.28 cent, United can actually charge an additional $29.1 to keep
the same market share. Consider another route from EWR to IAD. The current United
Airlines’ program issued 1033.6 miles while the hypothetical program would have issued
212 miles. Under the hypothetical program, United needed to decrease its price by $26.9
to maintain its market share. In the same manner, we calculated the hypothetical price
change for every route and aggregate them together to study the impact of program change
on United Airlines revenues, as well as other airlines. The results are summarized below.
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Table 12: Revenue Benefit from Fare-based Issuance: Without IV
Airlines Southwest Delta United American
Revenue Benefit (2014) 1.95% 0.55% -0.92% -0.49%
Revenue Benefit (2015) 1.69% 0.34% -0.92% -1.32%
Table 13: Revenue Benefit from Fare-based Issuance: With IV
Airlines Southwest Delta United American
Revenue Benefit (2014) 7.08% 0.83% -1.50% -1.13%
Revenue Benefit (2015) 6.06% 0.37% -1.78% -1.09%
Table 12-13 suggest that the first movers (Southwest and Delta) benefited from the fare-
based programs, not the followers. Specifically, Southwest improved its revenues by 6.06%
under the fare-based program in 2015, and Delta improved by 0.37%. In fact, if Delta
changed its program in the earlier year, it could have enhanced its profit by 0.85%. By
simply manipulating the program deigns, the airlines were able to improve profits.
However, United lost a profit of 1.78% due to the program change. American would have
lost 1.09% of its total revenues by changing its program in 2015 (we do not have data in
2016).
The contrasting results are due to the following reasons. As shown in table 3 and 4,
Southwest and Delta offers flight routes of shorter distance. By changing from mileage-
based issuance to fare-based issuance, they are able to issue more miles to their frequent
flyers. Frequent flyers, earning more miles, are willing to accept higher prices. In such
way, the airlines enhance their profits. Specifically, the benefit is even more significant for
Southwest, since its average flight share (40%) at its operating airports is much higher in its
airports of operations, which leads to higher value of the issued miles. In contrast, United
and American operate longer-distance flights. Hence, they already issue many miles and
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cannot benefit from changing to the new program.
Issuing more miles lead to higher profits. However, it remains unclear whether the results
hold when the number of issued miles approaches infinity, since the current analysis is
limited by the range of issued miles in the data. It is likely that as more miles are put
into circulation, a redemption probability that is too low leads to reduced values of miles
eventually.
2.6. Conclusions
We have four conclusions:
First, frequent flyer miles carry values to customers only when they can be put into good
use. Both the award capacity and award choices have a significant impact on the value
of miles. At the average level of award capacity, a mile is valued between 2-4 cents in
customers’ decisions, which can be two times higher than the Tripadvisor.com benchmark.
Southwest miles are most valuable, yielding around 6 cent per mile; JetBlue miles are least
valuable at 1 cent per mile. Even within the same airlines, miles are valued differently by
customers from different regions. For example, an American Airlines mile is worth 6.52 cent
at JFK but is worthless at BUR.
Second, a redeemed mile is valued differently from an issued mile by customers. The average
value of a mile at redemption is 2.35 cent. Redeemed miles have higher values when they
are used from origin airports where their issuer provides more future flight options, and
to destination airports with higher flight fares. For instance, an American Airlines mile
redeemed from CLT to CVG is worth 3.25 cent; in comparison, if it is redeemed from BWI
to OAK, the value decreases to 1.92 cent, due to lower market share at BWI and lower
prices toward Oakland.
Third, compared to the objective value of miles, customers over-evaluate miles both at
issuance (by 139%) and redemption (by 346%). The huge difference may result from over-
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confidence of the redemption value and redemption probability.
Finally, airlines can improve profits (up to 7%) by simply manipulating program designs.
Specifically, short-distance carriers (Southwest and Delta) benefit from fare-based issuance
of miles, while long-distance carriers (American and United) find mileage-based issuance
more attractive. Airlines should pay careful attention to their flight attributes and design
its loyalty programs in order to issue more miles into circulation.
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CHAPTER 3 : THE EFFECT OF DYNAMIC PRICING ON UBER’S
DRIVER-PARTNERS
We study the effects of dynamic pricing (so-called “surge pricing”) on Uber’s driver-partners.
Using a natural experiment arising from a surge pricing service outage for a portion of Uber’s
driver-partners over 10 major cities, and a difference-in-differences approach, we study the
effect of showing the surge heatmap 1) on drivers’ decisions to relocate to areas with higher
or lower prices and 2) on drivers’ earnings. We demonstrate that the ability to see the
surge heatmap has a statistically significant impact on both outcomes, explaining 10%-60%
of Uber drivers’ self-positioning decisions and attracting drivers toward areas with higher
surge prices, and increasing drivers’ earnings on surged trips by up to 70%.
3.1. Introduction
The study of dynamic pricing at Uber and within other ride-sharing platforms has typically
focused at an aggregate spatial level. This literature argues that rider-side pricing influences
the number of riders wishing to take trips (10), and driver-side pricing along with this
volume of riders taking trips influences the availability of drivers to successfully fulfill those
trips (5; 8). This literature then seeks to understand how different pricing methodologies
influence outcome like social welfare and the firm’s profit (8; 3).
The way in which pricing influences availability of drivers, however, is multifaceted: This
influence may occur through (1) changing the numbers of drivers driving somewhere within
the city (by influencing drivers’ decisions to sign up for Uber, or when to drive within the
week); and (2) where to drive conditioned on having chosen to drive. The influence of price
on where drivers drive if it indeed occurs, presumably happens through influencing drivers’
expectations about the price and trip volume at a particular location in the near future.
This influence on expectations may be effected through the average or typical price at a
particular location and time of day/week as observed over longer timescales (days or weeks),
and/or through the signaling effect of the current price on price and trip volume in other
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nearby locations over a much shorter timescale (minutes or hours).
Much of this influence (when to drive, and influencing where to drive through average price)
can be effected by driver pricing schemes that are not dynamic. These could be effected
by changing the driver-side price slowly over time, perhaps advertising in advance what
the driver-side prices would be. Only the short-run signaling effect need be effected via a
dynamic pricing scheme. Moreover, anecdotal evidence is ambiguous on the whether this
short-run signaling effect is significant. While some drivers do report responding to the
real-time value of the surge multiplier, others advise against “chasing surge” (6), suggesting
that variability in surge prices and the costs of changing one’s location makes reacting too
strongly to surge prices disadvantageous.
If the short-run effect of dynamic pricing on signaling is not significant, and all of driver-side
pricing’s effect on driver availability occurs through slower timescales, one could imagine an
alternate design from today’s ride-sharing platforms using a static or slowly-varying driver-
side pricing scheme intended to replicate the average-case dynamics of today’s dynamic
scheme, together with a more dynamic rider-side pricing scheme that reacts to short-term
fluctuations in demand. This would be of particular interest because the dynamic nature of
Uber’s surge pricing has generated a great deal of attention, particularly within the popular
press (18? ; 12), but also within the academic literature (3).
On the other hand, if the short-run effect of dynamic pricing on signaling is significant,
then this alternatively suggests that supply-side dynamic pricing schemes can be useful
mechanisms for reducing friction in labor markets, and may have implications for other
two-sided markets where labor is constrained in space, in time, by skill-set, or by specialty.
Moreover, while intertemporal substitution of labor has been studied in ridesharing and
taxi markets in the context of income targeting (9) and long-run supply elasticity (13),
spatial elasticity in ridesharing markets has been under-investigated. The most closely-
related paper to our knowledge (4) estimates taxi drivers’ “spatial equilibrium” behavior
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in NYC and the impact of pricing policy. While both their papers and ours study similar
settings using MNL models, their paper focuses mainly on the impact of ex-ante beliefs
of location values on drivers’ movement decisions, without the consideration of dynamic
pricing or other real-time information. In contrast, our paper focuses on the impact of
real-time spatial pricing on drivers’ decisions.
In this paper, we study this question empirically using a natural experiment in which Uber’s
surge prices ceased to be visible for drivers using phones on the iOS operating system in 10
of its largest markets. Using a difference-in-differences approach (2; 7), and controlling for
a number of confounding factors, we provide evidence that dynamic surge prices do have a
significant effect on drivers’ self-positioning decisions, causing drivers to drive toward nearby
areas with higher surge values. We also show that having access to real-time information
from the surge heatmap increased earnings for unaffected drivers, controlling for systematic
differences between drivers using iOS and Android phones. This suggests that dynamic
pricing is useful as a real-time signaling tool for reducing frictions in the ridesharing labor
market, better aligning drivers’ locations with riders’ desire to take trips.
The use of a natural experiment is critical for answering the question of whether information
provided by the surge heatmap causes drivers to relocate over short timescales. This is
because endogeneity is particularly problematic for understanding causality in the surge
heatmap’s relationship to drivers’ repositioning decisions. Drivers learn the areas of their
city where demand tends to outstrip supply, and they tend to drive toward those areas to
benefit from shorter wait times between trips and higher surge multiplies. If drivers make
these repositioning decisions exclusively based on their private knowledge, and not based on
the real-time information present in the surge heatmap, then we would nevertheless expect
to see a correlation between the surge heatmap’s multipliers and drivers’ repositioning
decisions. Disentangling this effect from the causal impact of the heatmap on drivers’
movements would be challenging.
The natural experiment allows us to disentangle these effects. Using a difference-in-differences
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approach within a multinomial logit discrete choice model, we can compare the relocation
decisions and earnings on the outage weekend among iOS drivers with an estimate for what
these decisions and earnings would have been without the outage based on data from other
weekends on all drivers, and data from the outage weekend from unaffected Android drivers.
In addition to the work cited above on ridesharing, our work is also related to the larger
literature on spatial mobility in labor markets (16), and in particular to empirical analyses
of the spatial elasticity of labor supply (15, Chapter 9,), (14). While related, this literature
has typically focused on spatial mobility over longer time and spatial scales. More generally,
our work can be viewed within the larger literature on informational and physical frictions
in labor markets (16). This literature often focuses on search (17), and within this context,
the surge heatmap can be seen as an aid that reduces the cost of search for drivers in the
ridesharing market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a description of method-
ology, including Uber’s pricing system, the natural experiment, a driver behavior model
and its difference-in-differences estimation. Section 3 dives into the estimation results and
their implications of the effects of dynamic pricing on both driver movement and earnings.
Finally, Section 4 summarizes with conclusions.
3.2. Methodology
We will analyze a natural experiment in which an outage made the surge heatmap unavail-
able for drivers using the iOS driver app in many of Uber’s largest cities over one weekend.
To analyze this experiment, we use a multinomial logit model over the driver’s direction of
motion. This MNL model uses utility determined by a factor model over the change in surge
multiplier in each direction of movement, the visibility of the surge heatmap, the driver’s
operating system, a time indicator controlling for changes in driver movement between the
outage and non-outage weeks, and driver covariates intended to control for differences in
behavior between iOS and Android drivers. Under the assumption of zero coefficients for
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the two-way interaction between the operating system and time terms, and for the three-
way interaction between operating system, time, and surge multiplier change, this analysis
is able to identify the impact of making the surge heatmap visible to drivers, with results
presented in section 3.3.
We now describe this methodology in detail, first summarizing background on Uber’s surge
pricing system (section 3.2.1), then summarizing the MNL model (section 3.2.3) and factor
utility model (section 3.2.4), and finally describing the natural experiment and how the
MNL and factor utility model was applied to analyze it (section 3.2.5).
3.2.1. Background on Uber’s Surge Pricing System
Uber operates a two-sided market in which individuals wishing to take a trip (“riders”)
are matched with other individuals willing to drive them for a fee (“drivers”). The rider
requests a trip via a smartphone application, the “rider app”, and the driver accepts or
rejects dispatch requests via another smartphone application, the “driver app”. We focus
on the UberX service in which a single rider or party of riders occupies a car, and do not
discuss other Uber products.
At the time when the natural experiment we analyze occurred, both the price paid by the
rider and the fee earned by the driver for participating in the UberX service were both set
via a “surge multiplier” and the “unsurged fare”. The unsurged fare was computed from the
time and distance traveled by the driver with the rider in the vehicle via a fixed city-specific
linear functon, while the surge multiplier was computed dynamically as described below.
The rider price was then obtained by multiplying the unsurged fare by the surge multiplier.
The driver’s earnings for the trip were then calculated by removing a fixed commission from
the total amount paid by the rider.
Cities are partitioned into non-overlapping uniform hexagons, each with an edge length of
0.2 miles (0.32km). Each hexagon is assigned its own surge multiplier, which is recalculated
every 2 minutes, and is applied to all trips starting in that hexagon over that two minute
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period.
Uber sets surge multipliers dynamically and algorithmically. This algorithm sets surge
multiplier based on the number of riders in the process of using the rider app to make trip
requests in a geographically localized area, the number of driver partners in or near that
area who have made themselves available to conduct trips via the driver app, as well as
some additional factors.
The surge pricing algorithm is designed to balance supply and demand in real time: when
the number of trip requests seem likely to exceed the number of trips that nearby cars can
fulfill, it increases the surge multiplier to ensure that only riders that place a high value on
taking a trip do so, and to attract drivers to the undersupplied area.
It is reasonable to expect that drivers would prefer to be in hexagons with high surge
multipliers, both because a higher surge multiplier results in a larger payment to the driver
holding fixed a trip’s time and distance, and because a higher surge multiplier typically
indicates that the ratio of riders to drivers is high and thus a driver’s waiting time for a
trip will be short. Uber also prefers drivers to move to areas with higher surge multipliers,
because their presence in high-demand areas allows more riders to take trips with lower
waiting times.
To support this movement toward surging areas, the driver app shows a visualization
called the “surge heatmap” (see Figure 7) that displays the current surge multiplier in
each hexagon. Drivers can see this surge heatmap when they have indicated in the driver
app they will consider dispatch requests and they are not currently servicing a request.
We call such drivers in the “open” state. Drivers who are unwilling to consider dispatch
requests (either because they have indicated so in the app, or the app is turned off) are
considered to be in the “oﬄine” state. Once a rider is matched with an open driver, the
driver is given directions on where to meet the rider and the surge heatmap is no longer
visible. We call drivers on their way to pick up a rider “en route,” and drivers who are
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driving with a rider in the car “on-trip.”
Figure 7: Screenshot of the surge
heatmap in the Uber driver app.
The surge heatmap shows the cur-
rent value of the surge multiplier in
each hexagon to driver partners.
In the following sections we describe mathematical
methodology used to model driver behavior in re-
sponse to this surge heatmap and other information
they may have, in preparation for describing and an-
alyzing a natural experiment pertinent to the ques-
tion of whether drivers’ movement decisions are in-
fluenced by this surge heatmap.
3.2.2. Data Overview
We used data from three data sources: 1) surge
heatmap data that stores the time series of surge val-
ues in each hexagon across the cities; 2) driver loca-
tion data that records each driver’s hexagon location
at the beginning of each minute; 3) driver metric data
that contains basic driver information, including the
operating system of their phones. Table 1 provides
summary facts for this data sets in the 10 largest
cities.
Combining the three data sets we create a data set
ready for analysis (Table 2). Each row describes the information related to one driver-
minute, including driver, time, driver’ current hexagon, next hexagon he moved to, as well
as the price information of all the surrounding hexagons and driver iOS information.
3.2.3. A Model of Driver Behavior
Consider a driver d in the open state at minute t in hexagon i, deciding whether to stay or
move. We are interested in this driver’s desired direction of motion. To study this, we record
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his state (open, en-route, on-trip, or oﬄine) at minute t + 1, and if he is open, en-route
or on-trip we record his location. For drivers that are open at minute t + 1, we determine
whether each driver remains in the same hexagon i (indicating this lack of motion by j = 0),
has moved to one of the 6 immediately adjacent hexagons (indicating these directions of
motion by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}), or has moved to some other hexagon. We model the selection
j as a choice made by a driver. This choice is illustrated below in Figure 8.
Figure 8: The figure illustrates a driver at an origin hexagon i (outlined in blue) choosing
which hexagon to move to next (adjacent hexagons are outlined in green). We model this
choice as being correlated with the change in smoothed surge multiplier (shown at right)
between the origin hexagon and the 3 hexagons in the chosen direction of motion.
Drivers that are not open at minute t + 1 or that move to a hexagon outside i and its 6
immediate neighbors are treated making choices that are unobserved. The most frequent
cause for not being open at time t + 1 is a driver’s being dispatched, placing them in en-
route state. Drivers can cross two hexagons in 1 minute if they are on a highway or another
arterial road permitting high-speed travel. The 7 values for j we consider include over 90%
of driver movements among drivers that remained open.
We model drivers’ choices using a multinomial logit (MNL) discrete choice model (1). Specif-
ically, we model an open driver’s utility of moving in direction j from hexagon i at minute
t as
u(t, i, j, d) + ξt,i,j,d.
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Here, ξt,i,j,d is an independent Gumbel distributed random variable. u(t, i, j, d) represents
the driver’s perceived utility of making movement direction j when in hexagon i at time t
for a driver with a set of driver features d. We will discuss the form of u(t, i, j, d) in detail
below.
While this model, conditioned on having an observation (which includes, for example, the
condition that the driver is not dispatched), and given a particular utility function, the
probability of observing choice j is,
P (j|t, i, d) = exp(u(t, i, j, d))∑6
j′=0 exp(u(t, i, j
′, d))
.
A number of factors may contribute to a driver’s choice of j. We are interested most
importantly in the causal effect of the surge multiplier, but also the confounding effect that
motion may be correlated with the surge multiplier because drivers tend to move toward
high-demand areas and high-demand areas tend to surge. To allow our model to capture
the dependence of motion on such factors, we include in our utility u(t, i, j, d) the difference
in smoothed surge multiplier ∆p(t, i, j) between the origin hexagon i and for the hexagon in
direction j. We will address possible confounding through the natural experiment discussed
below.
More precisely, the term ∆p(t, i, j) is computed by first computing a “smoothed” surge
multiplier for each hexagon, obtained by averaging the surge multipliers in the hexagons in
three concentric rings. This provides a smoothed surge price for the origin p(t, i) and for
the hexagons in the 6 directions p(t, j). Then ∆p(t, i, j) = p(t, j)−p(t, i) is the difference in
these prices. The values of the smoothed surge multipliers and corresponding ∆p(t, i, j) are
presented in the column ”Smoothed” in the table in Figure 8. The values in the “Immediate”
column are based on the non-smoothed surge multipliers from only a single hexagon. The
motivation of using smoothed multipliers is to capture the attraction of surged hexagons
that are further away than one ring. When we did not smooth multipliers, we saw similar
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results on all metrics.
Another factor that may contribute to a driver’s choice of j is whether the heatmap was
visible when the driver was making his or her decision. This will be encoded through a
factor invisible(d, t), which takes a value of 0 for drivers d and times t for which the surge
heatmap was visible to open drivers (as is typical), and takes a value of 1 when the heatmap
is hidden, as it was in the outage in our natural experiment.
While we discuss in more detail the specific functional form assumed for u(t, i, j, d) in the
next section, and discuss assumptions following from that functional form there, we note
and briefly discuss assumptions we have made thus far:
A1. ξt,i,j,d are independent across t, i, j, d. This assumes implicitly and in particular that
driver d’s decisions are not directly influenced by other drivers in the immediate area.
It does, however, allow a driver’s decisions to be influenced indirectly by other nearby
drivers, through the impact their presence has on surge multipliers and waiting times.
A2. The dependence of u(t, i, j, d) on hexagon i and direction j is only through the price
difference ∆p(t, i, j).
A3. Drivers’ movement decisions are not influenced by surge multipliers further than the
4th ring of hexagons from their current hexagon. This is a distance of approximately
1.5 miles.
A4. Observations of drivers movements are censored independently of their unobserved
movement decisions.
A5. We assume that the probability distribution describing driver’s choices’ has the func-
tional form of an MNL model.
We now discuss the functional form of u(t, i, j, d) in detail.
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3.2.4. The Utility Function
Without loss of generality, we normalize the utility of staying in the same hexagon, u(t, i, 0, d),
to be 0. The utility of moving in direction j, u(t, i, j, d), then is the change in the driver’s
utility relative to staying. To model the value of u(t, i, j, d) for j > 0, we use a factor model
containing the following features:
• the difference in surge multiplier ∆p(t, i, j) discussed above
• a collection of driver metrics that depend on d: the operating system, the driver’s age,
and the driver’s tenure on the Uber platform. We discuss and motivate these choices
below. We indicate these here in a generic way with a vector x(d) with components
xk(d), where k starts at 0.
• the binary indicator invisible(d, t) that is 1 if the heatmap is hidden to drivers and 0
otherwise
• a binary time indicator T (t). Within the analysis of the natural experiment, we will
apply our factor model to data collected over two weeks. This indicator will take the
value 1 for the week when the outage occurred, and 0 in the previous week.
This model has the following specific form:
u(t, i, j, d) = β0 + β1 ·∆p(t, i, j)
+ T (t) · [β2 + β3 · ·∆p(t, i, j)]
+ invisible(d, t)[β4 + β5 ·∆p(t, i, j)]
+
∑
k
xk(d) · [β6+3k ·+β7+3k ·∆p(t, i, j) + β8+3k · T (t) + β9+3k ·∆p(t, i, j) · T (t)]
(3.1)
The first row of coefficients includes a constant term β0, which one can interpret as the
value of moving out of the current hexagon if all other factors are 0 (recall that this utility
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is the value for all j > 0, and the utility at j = 0 is fixed to 0). It also includes a term β1
that represents the desirability of moving toward increasing surge multiplier. The second
and third rows contains similar terms, but now interacted with the time indicator T (t) in
the second row and the surge visibility invisible(d, t) in the third. The fourth row also
contains similar terms interacted with each driver feature, and also the interaction of this
driver feature with the time indicator and the price difference.
Taken collectively, the sum β1 + β3 · T (t) + β5 · invisible(d, t) +
∑
k(β7+3k + β9+3k · T (t)) ·
xk(d) represents the dependence of the utility to the surge multiplier gradient, including
both dependence due to causal factors (drivers being attracted to areas with higher surge
multiplier) and due to non-causal confounding factors (drivers wishing to move toward areas
that are good to drive in, that happen to also have higher surge gradients). The coefficient
of β5 determines how this sensitivity changes when the surge heatmap is hidden, and it is
on this coefficient that we will focus when using the natural experiment to understand the
causal relationship between the surge heatmap and driver movement.
We take note of the model form (3.1) as an assumption.
A6. We assume that drivers’ utility is modeled by the functional form (3.1).
3.2.5. Description of the Natural Experiment
During the weekend of November 4th to 6th in 2016, cities served by one of Uber’s data
centers suffered from a technical outage in the surge pricing system. These cities included
New York City, Boston, Chicago, Washington DC, and many other cities in the United
States and around the world. In the affected cities, drivers using the driver app on an iOS
phone (so-called “iOS drivers”) received a blank map with no surge information. Drivers
using the driver app on an Android phone (so-called “Android drivers”) could see the surge
heatmap as usual. The outage only affected iOS drivers’ ability to see the surge heatmap,
but did not change the way in which they were paid.
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The dispatch screen shown to drivers when they are offered a trip indicates the surge
multiple, and this was working normally. Thus, while some drivers at some times were
likely unaware that there was an outage and simply thought no areas were surging, many
drivers would have quickly become aware that the surge heatmap was not working, especially
those positioned in parts of the city that were surging.
The natural experiment enables us to study the impact of the lack of visibility of the surge
heatmap on drivers by, roughly speaking, comparing the difference between iOS and Android
drivers on the outage week and another non-outage week, while controlling for systematic
differences between these two groups. If lack of visibility has an impact, then this difference
between iOS and Android drivers should change significantly during the outage week. For
the weekend unaffected by the outage, we gathered data from the weekend of 10/22 to
10/24. This skips the immediately previous Halloween weekend, since Halloween is one of
Uber’s busiest days and causes unusual activity.
3.2.6. Difference-in-Differences Estimation (DID)
To apply the previously discussed model within our natural experiment, we explicitly write
our list of driver metrics as x(d) = (iOS(d), age(d), tenure(d)). Here, iOS(d) is a binary
variable that is 1 if the driver uses an iOS phone; age(d) is a continuous variable storing
the driver’s age; and tenure(d) is a continuous variable storing the number of years that
have passed since the driver signed up to drive with Uber. The choice of iOS(d) allows
us to compare drivers that experienced the outage from those that did not, while the two
covariates are present to control for systematic differences between iOS and Android drivers,
as discussed below.
We then note that the surge heatmap is only hidden during the outage week for iOS drivers.
Thus, invisible(d, t) = iOS(d)× T (t).
We finally make the following additional assumption, in light with the parallel trend as-
sumption ((7)) typically made in applications of DID methodology.
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A7. The coefficients on the interaction terms iOS(d) ·T (t) and iOS(d) ·T (t) ·∆p(t, i, j) are
0.
Assumption A7 assumes that the difference between iOS and Android drivers stays the same
week over week (except for the outage), and as we change the surge multiplier gradient
∆p(t, i, j). To help ensure that A7 is met, we include age(d) and tenure(d) and their
interactions with T (t), ∆p(t) and T (t) ·∆p(t) in our regression. This is discussed in more
detail in the next section.
Applying these three modeling choices to the utility model (3.1), we obtain:
u(t, i, j, d) = β0 + β1 ·∆p(t, i, j)
+ T (t) · [β2 + β3 ·∆p(t, i, j)]
+ invisible(d, t) · [β4 + β5 ·∆p(t, i, j)]
+ tenure(d) · [β6 + β7 ·∆p(t, i, j) + β8 · T (t) + β9 ·∆p(t, i, j) · T (t)]
+ age(d)[β10 + β11 ·∆p(t, i, j) + β12 · T (t) + β13 ·∆p(t, i, j) · T (t)]
+ iOS(d) · [β14 + β15 ·∆p(t, i, j)]
To estimate the model parameters, we use maximum likelihood estimation with the likeli-
hood implied by this factor model for the utility and the MNL model over driver decisions
j. To create confidence intervals and perform hypothesis tests, we use a bootstrapping
approach (11).
Within this model and estimation method, the sensitivity to the surge gradient is given by
β1 + β3 · T (t) + β5 · invisible(d, t) + β7 · tenure(d) + β9 · tenure(d) · T (t)+
β11 · age(d) + β13 · age(d) · T (t) + β15 · iOS(d).
(3.2)
With this in mind, we wish to test the following hypotheses about this sensitivity in our
analysis:
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• that equation (3.2) is positive (indicating that drivers tend to move toward surge) for
typical values of T (t), tenure(d), age(d), and iOS(d) when invisible(d, t) = 0
• β5 is negative, showing that sensitivity of movement to surge is reduced when the
heatmap is not visible
• that equation (3.2) remains non-negative when invisible(d, t) = 1, showing that lack
of visibility of the surge heatmap does not cause drivers to move away from surge
Additionally, the coefficient associated with staying in the same place when ∆p = 0 is given
by
β0 + β2 · T (t) + β4 · invisible(d, t) + β6 · tenure(d) + β8 · tenure(d) · T (t)+
β10 · age(d) + β12 · age(d) · T (t) + β14 · iOS(d)
(3.3)
We wish to test the hypotheses that:
• this coefficient is negative for typical values of T (t), tenure(d), age(d), and iOS(d)
when invisible(d, t) = 0.
• this coefficient remains negative when invisible(d, t) = 1.
3.2.7. Differences Across Operating Systems and Time
Our approach relies on the assumption (A7) that iOS(d) · T (t) and iOS(d) · T (t) ·∆p(t, i, j)
have zero coefficients. To study this assumption, we study the difference between the two
weekends in our analysis, and the difference between iOS and Android drivers. We find
differences both across weekends and across groups, which are mitigated by controlling for
time, operating system, and other driver covariates in our analysis.
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Figure 9: Surge Multipliers Over Time: The left-hand plot shows the percentage of drivers’
earnings that were due to surge on the outage weekend and the previous non-outage weekend
in each of the cities in our analysis. The right-hand plot similarly shows the percentage of
surged trips between the two weekends and across cities.
Differences Across Time
Market conditions are determined by the imbalance between demand and supply. On the
demand side, large events, weather and traffic conditions influence customers’ need for a
rider; on the supply side, incentive campaigns, competitors’ strategies and other opportunity
costs affect drivers’ driving hours. There is no guarantee that market conditions over any two
weekends are similar. Indeed, demand and supply patterns behave differently over the two
weekends studied, and the surge pricing algorithms adjusts for the change correspondingly,
as shown by the statistics in Figure 9.
In general, the previous weekend was more supply-constrained and consequently surged
more. For example, 41% of trips in Boston had a surge multiplier strictly larger than 1
in the previous weekend while only 12% of trips in the outage weekend did. Similarly,
surge impacted drivers’ income to a different extent over the two weekends. Surge income
constituted 17% of all drivers’ income during the past week, but only 5% during the outage
weekend.
Differences between the iOS and Android Drivers
Drivers’ choice of the phone’s operating system (OS) might reflect differences in demo-
graphics, which are correlated with their driving habits. To test this, we collected data on
drivers’ age and tenure (years since singing up for Uber) along with their phones’ operating
systems. Data exhibited extreme diversity: drivers’ age ranged from 18 to 82, and tenure
varied from just a few days to over six years.
Figure 10 shows that iOS drivers are on average younger than Android drivers in all cities.
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However, the ordering of their tenure differs across cities. Specifically, an average iOS drivers
has a longer tenure in Chicago (CHI), Boston (BOS), Washington D.C.(DC), Hong Kong
(HK), Moscow (MOW) and New Jersey (NJ), while an average android Android driver has
a longer tenure in New York (NYC), Atlanta (ATL), and Dallas (DAL).
Figure 10: Differences by Operating System: The figures show the tenure (left) and age
(right) for iOS and Android Drivers, by city. Confidence intervals for the mean value are
shown using the standard deviation of the sample mean.
To address these differences, we include tenure and age as covariates in our factor model,
their interactions with T (t) and ∆p(t, i, j), as well as the covariate iOS(d).
To further verify Assumption A7, we include in the appendix the results of a DiD analysis
with two regular weekends, which concludes that the coefficient on iOS(d) · T (t) ·∆p(t, i, j)
is 0.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Impact of Surge on Driver Movement
Maximum likelihood estimates along with confidence intervals for model coefficients are
listed in Table 3. This table consists of two parts i) coefficients described in (3.3) that
represent the disutility of moving away from the current hexagon when ∆p(t, i, j) = 0; and
ii) coefficients described in (3.2) that represent the sensitivity of movement to the surge
gradient ∆p(t, i, j).
The table leads to several conclusions. First, it shows that in all cities, drivers incur a
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disutility for driving out of the current hexagon (β0 < 0). Moreover, if they choose to drive
out, they derive a higher utility when they are driving toward hexagons with higher surge
values (β1 > 0). As the estimated value of β0 is large and negative compared to the other
coefficients in (3.3), if we compute (3.3) for another combination of factors the coefficient
will remain negative. A similar statement tends to hold for β1 and (3.2), although not
universally.
Second, surge information impacted driver movement, even when controlling for confound-
ing factors. Lack of visibility of the surge heatmap caused drivers to be less sensitive to
surge differences: β5 is significantly negative for all cities except for Washington D.C. and
New Jersey. Without the real-time knowledge of seeing the surge heatmap, iOS drivers had
a weaker signal of where to drive.
Table 3 quantifies the exogenous effect (β5) and endogenous effect (β1 + β3 + β15) of surge
for iOS drivers respectively. Therefore, we can measure the actual value of the real time
surge information on movement, out of the total surge-movement effect, as
e =
−β5
β1 + β3 + β15
The exogenous effect of the heatmap accounted for 10% to 60% of the movement effect
(Figure 11). Consistent with discussion below, the effect is the lowest in the large cities
with more experienced drivers and higher surge (New York, Boston, Chicago).
Third, in all of the 10 cities, more experienced drivers were less likely to drive out of the
current hexagon (β6 < 0). Here are two potential explanations: 1) experienced drivers
understood that real-time demand conditions may change rapidly, and an imbalance that
was causing surge may indeed dissipate in the 2 minutes that pass between surge calcula-
tions. For this reason, they chase surge less often than inexperienced drivers; 2) experienced
drivers, afraid of being dispatched out of a low-surge hexagon, turned off their Open status
(go Oﬄine) to be indispatchable, then drive toward high-surge hexagon and become Open
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Figure 11: Impact of Surge Information on Movement (%)
Removed Cities with insignificant coefficient (DC, NJ)
upon arrival. When they were Open, they did not need to move further. While experienced
drivers moved less often, their movement might be more or less sensitive to the surge values
in the direction of movement (β7). Interestingly, in big cities (Boston, Chicago, Washing-
ton D.C.), experienced drivers are less attracted by surge; in small cities (Melbourn, Hong
Kong, Moscow and New Jersey), the effect was reversed.
3.3.2. Impact of Surge on Driver Earnings
We now ask whether access to the surge heatmap improves drivers’ earnings using a similar
DID analysis. Specifically, we model driver d’s change in hourly earnings from the previous
weekend as
Earningsoutage(d)−Earningsprevious(d) = α0+α1·iOS(d)+α2·age(d)+α3·tenure(d)+ηd (3.4)
Since iOS drivers were not able to “chase surge” in the outage weekend, we might expect
a drop in earnings compared to Android drivers (α1 < 0). This drop is purely due to the
movement activity by utilizing the information on the map, instead of any surge difference
on trips at the same dispatched locations. Table 4 summarizes the results of this analysis.
Indeed, iOS drivers earned significantly less in most cities. In the two exceptions (Atlanta
and New Jersey), surge constitute less than 3% of all driver earnings during the outage
weekend, explaining why no significant difference was detected between iOS and Android
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drivers’ earnings in these two areas.
On average, the absence of surge information reduced driver earnings by 20 to 80 cents
per hour. This amount does not seem striking, constituting only 1% to 4% of drivers’
total earnings (Figure 12). However, recall: 1) the outage did not change the surged
earnings the drivers could get; 2) surged earnings only constituted 2% to 12% of all driver
earnings, i.e., 40 cents to $3 per hour depending on the city. In fact, dividing the earnings’
difference (α1) due to the outage by the total surged earnings, we can caliberate the effects
of self-positioning on surge earnings, which ranges from 10% to as high as 70% (Figure 13).
The absence of the heatmap reduced driver earnings in the small cities the most, possibly
because these drivers had less experience and they relied more heavily on the heatmap to
make positioning decisions.
Figure 12: Effects of Self-Positioning on Total Earnings (%)
Removed Cities with insignificant coefficient (ATL, HK, NJ)
Figure 13: Effects of Self-Positioning on Surged Earnings (%)
Removed Cities with insignificant coefficient (ATL, HK, NJ)
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3.4. Conclusions
This paper studies the short-run effect of dynamic pricing on Uber’s driver partners’ self-
positioning decisions and earnings. We first built up a driver positioning model in a Multi-
nomial Logit setup. Then we used data on a natural experiment covering 135,800 active
drivers over two weekends and performed a difference-in-differences estimation that resolved
endogeneity issues. The results suggest drivers rely heavily on the real-time dynamic pricing
information to make self-positioning decisions, and the effect is lower (10% 30%) in big cities
with professional drivers and higher (30% -60%) in small cities and with less experienced
drivers. By utilizing this information, drivers can identify potential earning opportunities
and significantly improve their surged earnings by up to 70%.
The results imply strong evidence that dynamic pricing is useful as a real-time signaling
tool for drivers to make self-positioning decisions that aligns with rider’s willingness to pay,
reducing frictions in the ride-sharing labor market, better aligning drivers locations with
riders desire to take trips.
97
: Bibliography
[1] S. P. Anderson, A. De Palma, and J. F. Thisse. Discrete choice theory of product
differentiation. MIT press, 1992.
[2] O. C. Ashenfelter and D. Card. Using the longitudinal structure of earnings to estimate
the effect of training programs, 1984.
[3] S. Banerjee, R. Johari, and C. Riquelme. Pricing in ride-sharing platforms: A queueing-
theoretic approach. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation, pages 639–639. ACM, 2015.
[4] N. Buchholz. Spatial equilibrium, search frictions and efficient regulation in the taxi
industry. Technical report, Technical report, University of Texas at Austin, 2015.
[5] G. P. Cachon, K. M. Daniels, and R. Lobel. The role of surge pricing on a service plat-
form with self-scheduling capacity. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
19(3):368–384, 2017.
[6] H. Campbell. Advice for new uber drivers — don’t chase the
surge!, 2017. URL https://maximumridesharingprofits.com/
advice-new-uber-drivers-dont-chase-surge/.
[7] D. Card. The impact of the mariel boatlift on the miami labor market. ILR Review,
43(2):245–257, 1990.
[8] J. C. Castillo, D. Knoepfle, and G. Weyl. Surge pricing solves the wild goose chase.
In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages
241–242. ACM, 2017.
[9] M. K. Chen and M. Sheldon. Dynamic pricing in a labor market: Surge pricing and
flexible work on the uber platform. In EC, page 455, 2016.
[10] P. Cohen, R. Hahn, J. Hall, S. Levitt, and R. Metcalfe. Using big data to estimate
consumer surplus: The case of uber. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2016.
[11] B. Efron. Bootstrap methods: another look at the jackknife. In Breakthroughs in
statistics, pages 569–593. Springer, 1992.
[12] M. Goncharova. Ride-hailing drivers are slaves to the surge. 2017.
[13] J. V. Hall and A. B. Krueger. An analysis of the labor market for ubers driver-partners
in the united states. ILR Review, page 0019793917717222, 2015.
[14] J. F. Madden. An empirical analysis of the spatial elasticity of labor supply. In Papers
of the Regional Science Association, volume 39, pages 157–171. Springer, 1977.
98
[15] A. Manning. Monopsony in motion: Imperfect competition in labor markets. Princeton
University Press, 2003.
[16] P. S. Morrison. Unemployment and urban labour markets. Urban Studies, 42(12):
2261–2288, 2005.
[17] R. Rogerson, R. Shimer, and R. Wright. Search-theoretic models of the labor market:
A survey. Journal of economic literature, 43(4):959–988, 2005.
[18] N. Scheiber. How uber uses psychological tricks to push its drivers’ buttons. 2017.
Appendix: DID Model without Driver Metrics
We also included a DID model with fewer predictors. The results are summarized in Table
5. Similarly, the model shows significant effects of the heatmap (iOS · week · ∆p) for all
cities except for Washington DC and New Jersey.
DID Model of Two Regular Weekends
Our conclusion of the impact of dynamic pricing on driver movement hinges on Assumption
A7 (The Parallel Trend Assumption), i.e., iOS and Android drivers do not exhibit diverse
trends in their sensitivity to prices, after controlling for different driver metrics (Age and
Tenure). To test this theory, we ran a similar DID analysis over two regular weekends,
including the previous weekend in the main analysis (10/22 to 10/24) and the weekend
before (10/15 to 10/17).
The results are summarized in Table 6. For almost all cities, the coefficient on iOS ·week ·p
is insignificant at 95% confidence interval with mixed signs. The only exception is New
Jersey, which had no significant results in the outage weekend analysis. This could possibly
due to random noise, or some experiment running in the city that had different builts in
the platforms.
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Table 14: Summary Statistics for 10 Largest Cities.
City Metrics Driver Metrics
Trips Surge Percentage Average Surge iOS Drivers iOS Supply Hours Android Drivers Android Supply Hours
NYC754753 0.16 1.07 35057 17539 34982 18627
BOS381959 0.13 1.02 8012 8838 7533 9600
CHI534294 0.19 1.07 11010 11496 13690 11539
DC 478290 0.07 1.01 5279 2251 5293 2550
ATL215983 0.03 1.01 4769 6512 7902 4198
DEN152086 0.17 1.13 2794 2684 4026 1996
MEL214744 0.15 1.05 6465 3891 4002 6104
HK117862 0.11 1.06 2269 2921 7401 982
MOW137170 0.07 1.06 1263 5010 6987 1068
NJ 232656 0.08 1.06 8009 4918 7967 3463
This table provides statistics on city pricing metrics and driver supply metrics related to trips and driver movements taken in the 10 cities
between November 4, 2016 and November 6, 2016. The surge percentage and average surge values are based on the surge data. The number
of active iOS and Android drivers and their supply hours (number of hours on the Uber platform) are collected through the movement data.
100
Table 15: Example of Data.
Row Driver Time OS Current
Hexagon
1-Ring Surge Values Next
Hexagon
0 Josie 9:00 iOS a0 (1.0,1.0,1.2,1.2,1.3,1.0, 1.2) a0
1 Josie 9:01 iOS a0 (1.2,1.0,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.0, 1.2) a1
2 Josie 9:02 iOS a1 (1.2,1.0,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.0, 1.2) a2
3 Josie 10:25 iOS a10 (1.8,2.2,1.7,1.6,1.5,1.5, 1.6) a12
4 Josie 10:26 iOS a12 (1.8,2.2,1.7,1.6,1.5,1.5, 1.6) a12
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
5 Mark 10:25 iOS b38 (1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0) b39
6 Mark 10:26 iOS b39 (1.0,1.2,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0) b40
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Each row is one driver-minute, recording the driver’s location, Operating system, movement in the next minute and the spatial prices of the
surrounding hexagons.
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Table 16: Driver Movement Results for 10 Largest Cities.
NYC BOS CHI DC ATL DAL MEL HK MOW NJ
const −2.94∗∗∗ −2.46∗∗∗ −2.48∗∗∗ −2.64∗∗∗ −2.44∗∗∗ −2.71∗∗∗ −2.73∗∗∗ −2.52∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗ −3.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
age −0.00 −0.17∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ −0.20 0.20∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) (0.02)
tenured days −0.00 ∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
week −0.00 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.02 ∗∗ −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
iOS 0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.03 ∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.33∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
age · week −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 −0.05 ∗∗ 0.03 ∗ −0.24∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.04 0.11 ∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.24) (0.03) (0.03)
tenured days · week 0.00 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.01 −0.02∗∗∗ 0.02 ∗∗ −0.01 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
iOS · week −0.01 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.02 ∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆p 1.25∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 3.20∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗∗ 5.61∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.35)
tenured days ·∆p −0.04 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.12 −0.18 ∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.65 ∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.77 ∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.27) (0.13) (0.30)
age ·∆p −0.02 −2.52∗∗∗ −0.30 0.15 −0.23 −0.16 3.77∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ −1.44 −0.79
(0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.16) (0.52) (0.31) (0.56) (0.06) (0.74) (1.72)
iOS ·∆p 0.10 0.18∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.04 0.34 ∗ 0.24 0.56∗∗∗ −0.10 0.44 ∗∗ −1.15 ∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.53)
week ·∆p 0.31∗∗∗ −0.18 ∗ −1.66∗∗∗ −1.94∗∗∗ −0.10 1.09∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.08 0.36
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.71)
tenured days · week ·∆p 0.04 0.01 0.28∗∗∗ 0.05 0.41∗∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗ 0.11 −0.45 −0.42 −0.74 ∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.19) (0.31) (0.24) (0.34)
age · week ·∆p 0.00 1.44 ∗ 0.02 0.62 ∗∗ 0.43 0.03 −0.11 0.97∗∗∗ −1.22 −0.15
(0.22) (0.67) (0.31) (0.21) (0.41) (0.30) (0.92) (0.02) (0.84) (1.88)
iOS · week ·∆p −0.29∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.08 −1.45∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗ −1.05∗∗∗ −0.72 ∗ −1.03∗∗∗ −0.19
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.30) (0.20) (0.17) (0.31) (0.26) (0.93)
N 4.7e6 1.7e6 2.8e6 1.2e6 1.1e6 5.1e5 9.1e5 6.8e5 6.4e5 9.8e5
*: p-value = 0.05 **: p-value = 0.01 ***: p-value = 0.001
Dependent variables are drivers’ hourly earning difference over the two weekends
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Table 17: Driver Earnings Results for 10 Largest Cities.
NYC BOS CHI DC ATL DAL MEL HK MOW NJ
const 0.23 −5.91∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ −2.56∗∗∗ −2.42∗∗∗ 0.02 −5.24∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ −0.36 ∗ −0.22
(0.22) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.31) (0.33) (0.09) (0.15) (0.18)
iOS −0.31 ∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.27 ∗∗ −0.24 ∗ 0.06 −0.61∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.31 ∗∗ −0.03
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.06) (0.10) (0.21)
age 0.01 0.63∗∗∗ 0.06 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11 ∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.08 0.01 0.07
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (0.07)
tenure −0.31∗∗∗ −1.17∗∗∗ −0.09 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗ −0.19 ∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.17
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18)
N 3.4e4 1.5e4 2.7e4 2.2e4 1.4e4 9.4e3 9.6e3 1.0e4 7.8e3 2.1e4
*: p-value = 0.05 **: p-value = 0.01 ***: p-value = 0.001
Dependent variables are drivers’ hourly earning difference over the two weekends
Table 18: Driver Movement Results for 10 Largest Cities without Driver Metrics (Appendix)
NYC BOS CHI DC ATL DAL MEL HK MOW NJ
const −2.94∗∗∗ −2.46∗∗∗ −2.48∗∗∗ −2.64∗∗∗ −2.43∗∗∗ −2.64∗∗∗ −2.71∗∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗ −3.10∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
week 0.00 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.01 ∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
iOS 0.03∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.17∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.01 0.31∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
iOS · week −0.01 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
∆p 1.28∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 2.42∗∗∗ 3.41∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 3.51∗∗∗ 5.86∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.34)
iOS ·∆p 0.05 0.14 ∗ −0.10 −0.00 0.39 0.31 0.58∗∗∗ −0.09 0.48 ∗∗ −1.43∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.24) (0.24) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.36)
week ·∆p 0.31∗∗∗ −0.17 −1.64∗∗∗ −1.73∗∗∗ −0.06 1.11∗∗∗ −1.25∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.16 0.20
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.33) (0.23) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.53)
iOS · week ·∆p −0.24 ∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.21 −1.65∗∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗ −0.76 ∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗ 0.41
(0.08) (0.16) (0.09) (0.13) (0.48) (0.24) (0.19) (0.25) (0.18) (0.56)
N 4.7e6 1.7e6 2.8e6 1.2e6 1.1e6 5.1e5 9.1e5 6.8e5 6.4e5 9.8e5
*: p-value = 0.05 **: p-value = 0.01 ***: p-value = 0.001
Dependent variables are drivers’ hourly earning difference over the two weekends
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Table 19: Driver Movement Results over Two Regular Weekends. (Appendix)
NYC BOS CHI DC ATL DAL MEL HK MOW NJ
const −2.80∗∗∗ −2.55∗∗∗ −2.53∗∗∗ −2.71∗∗∗ −2.62∗∗∗ −2.54∗∗∗ −2.63∗∗∗ −2.55∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗ −2.84∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
age −0.01 −0.07 ∗∗ 0.00 0.15∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.21) (0.06) (0.02)
tenured days −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 ∗∗ −0.03 ∗∗ −0.02 ∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
week −0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.26∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
iOS −0.00 −0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
age · week 0.00 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.03 ∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ −0.05 0.79∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.19) (0.07) (0.04)
tenured days · week 0.01∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 ∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.03 ∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
iOS · week 0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.18∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 0.29∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆p 1.14∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 2.86∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.05) (0.17) (0.19) (0.09) (0.23) (0.16) (0.25) (0.13) (0.38)
tenured days ·∆p −0.08 0.15∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.29 ∗ 0.59∗∗∗ −0.09 0.74∗∗∗ 0.09 0.69∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.05) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.12) (0.41) (0.19) (0.20)
age ·∆p −0.24 −1.05 ∗∗ −4.47∗∗∗ −3.01 ∗∗ −0.44 −0.27 −7.86∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ −2.77 ∗ −1.33
(0.36) (0.34) (0.81) (1.07) (1.22) (0.14) (1.38) (0.18) (1.11) (0.77)
iOS ·∆p −0.00 0.16 ∗ 0.45 0.02 0.29 0.68 ∗ −0.12 0.03 1.06 ∗ −0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.34) (0.18) (0.58) (0.47) (0.55)
week ·∆p 0.13 0.04 0.61 ∗∗ −0.14 −0.04 0.41 −0.09 0.04 1.16∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.07) (0.22) (0.21) (0.15) (0.29) (0.26) (0.21) (0.17) (0.52)
tenured days · week ·∆p 0.03 −0.28∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.20 0.33 0.00 0.12
(0.08) (0.05) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.10) (0.59) (0.24) (0.29)
age · week ·∆p 0.26 −1.46 ∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗ 3.24 ∗∗ 0.19 −0.09 11.69∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.76 −0.15
(0.36) (0.47) (1.09) (1.19) (1.25) (0.09) (1.39) (0.17) (1.17) (0.46)
iOS · week ·∆p 0.06 0.00 −0.36 −0.02 −0.18 −0.13 0.42 −0.09 −0.66 −1.45 ∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.25) (0.20) (0.32) (0.26) (0.30) (0.54) (0.55) (0.72)
N 3.8e6 1.1e6 2.2e6 1.6e6 6.8e5 3.2e5 5.2e5 6.1e5 4.2e5 7.5e5
*: p-value = 0.05 **: p-value = 0.01 ***: p-value = 0.001
Dependent variables are drivers’ hourly earning difference over the two weekends
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